holding that defendant was not denied a fair trial as a result of pretrial publicity; coverage was extensive but typical for a case of its nature and not “unprecedented” in intensity
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant was not denied a fair trial as a result of pretrial publicity; coverage was extensive but typical for a case of its nature and not “unprecedented” in intensity
- determining that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s denying a continuance of the trial
- distinguishing Crowe and finding no prejudice in admitting magnified photos of actual items of physical evidence obtained from the crime scene
- “defendant has not presented, nor do we perceive independently, any State constitutional basis for departing from our prior cases and the now-consistent Supreme Court position on the issue”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In discussing the issues presented in this appeal, the majority states: “The last example of alleged improper cross-examination admittedly gives us pause.” (115 Ill. 2d at 279.) Indeed it should; it is the most flagrant example of improper, prejudicial cross-examination to come before this court in the many cases involving death penalties.
Defendant correctly asserts that these questions were not designed to elicit facts but were intended to, and did, degrade the defendant in the eyes of the jury, to his prejudice.
The integrity of the judicial process requires that this type of interrogation be prohibited and that a judgment resulting from such tactics be reversed. The belated sustaining of an objection to the questions falls far short of removing the prejudice which it created.
I agree with the majority that the misconduct here does not fit the pattern of that found in People v. Adams (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 102 , People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373 , or People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342 ; it was much more egregious. In those cases the prosecutor had some basis, however tenuous, for his position; here there is no justification for the type of cross-examination shown in this record.
Although I agree with the majority that the conviction for murder must be affirmed, I am of the opinion that defendant did not receive a fair hearing. I would vacate the death penalty and remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing.
CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., join in this- partial concurrence and partial dissent.