Opinion

Hawkins v. Auto-Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co.

  • 608 N.E.2d 1358
  • 1993 Ind. LEXIS 20
  • 1993 WL 33655
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Filed
Feb 11, 1993
Status
Published
Author
DeBRULER
On the bench
Givan, Shepard, Krahulik, Debruler, Dickson
Cited by
13 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.2%

Overruled on other grounds by Kimberlin v. DeLong, 1994 Ind. LEXIS 64 (1994)

“A deputy prosecutor does not represent the victims or witnesses in a criminal proceeding, but rather, is the State’s representative”

How later courts described this case

  • “A deputy prosecutor does not represent the victims or witnesses in a criminal proceeding, but rather, is the State’s representative”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled on other grounds by Kimberlin v. DeLong, 1994 Ind. LEXIS 64 (1994)

    Co. (1993), Ind., 608 N.E.2d 1358, 1359, overruled on other grounds, Kimberlin v. DeLong (1994), Ind., 637 N.E.2d 121, reh'g denied.
    Indiana Supreme CourtJun 13, 1994other groundsmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

DeBRULER, Justice,

dissenting.

As pointed out by Judge Buchanan for the Second District, Hawkins v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. (1991), Ind.App, 579 N.E.2d 118 , this declaratory judgment of the trial court is not a summary judgment and should be reversed because it is based upon determinations of material issues of fact without a trial. Ind.Trial Rule 56; I.C. 34-4-10-9; Bochnowski v. Peoples Federal S. & L. (1991), Ind., 571 N.E.2d 282 ; Brandon v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 177 , 340 N.E.2d 756 ; City of Muncie v. United Nat. Ins. Co. (1991), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 979 . I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court to afford the guardian of Lewis an opportunity to file an answer and to have a trial at which a trier of fact would resolve the material issues of fact. The main factual issues to be so resolved would necessarily include whether the insured, Stephens, expected or intended the bodily injury suffered by Lewis, and possibly whether Stephens was insane at the time if raised by answer. I am willing to say that at such trial, the statute, 1.0. 34-3-18-1, should be given its proper force, which is, in my opinion, that it renders relevant judgments of convictions based upon trials admissible on the same basis that relevant judgments of convictions based upon guilty pleas had for many years been admitted. Furthermore, I find nothing in the statute rendering the entire transcript of the criminal trial evidence that is per se admissible, and I agree with others who have studied this statute and who have failed to find legislative intent within it to make evidence of a criminal *1360 judgment conclusive proof of any facts of which it may be probative. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Miles, 780 F.Supp. 1462 (S.D.Ind.1990). The majority opinion imposes a statutory estoppel where none exists.

DICKSON, J., concurs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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