explaining that, “[i]n [State v. Muller, 829 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) ] we made clear that ‘the State's noncompliance with the specific provisions of Art. 44.01 [is] a substantive failure to invoke the court of appeals’ statutorily defined jurisdiction.' We concluded that Art. 44.01 'does more than merely prescribe a procedural guideline for filing the State's notice of appeal. Rather it limits the State's substantive authority to appeal.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, “[i]n [State v. Muller, 829 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) ] we made clear that ‘the State's noncompliance with the specific provisions of Art. 44.01 [is] a substantive failure to invoke the court of appeals’ statutorily defined jurisdiction.' We concluded that Art. 44.01 'does more than merely prescribe a procedural guideline for filing the State's notice of appeal. Rather it limits the State's substantive authority to appeal.’ ”
- concluding that (1) the lack of a timely certification in a State's notice of appeal deprived the court of appeals of jurisdiction, and (2) an amended, but untimely, certification did not retroactively confer jurisdiction
- concluding appellate rule of procedure 25.2(d), which allows a defendant to amend his notice of appeal, may not be used so as to create jurisdiction where none previously existed
- recognizing that failure by State to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Bayless v. State, 2002 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 241 (2002)
13 S.W.3d 408, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801
Distinguished
Distinguished by Feathers Jr., Bruce Earl v. State (2002)
contends that Riewe is distinguishable from
The opinion
WOMACK,. J.,
Concurring.
I believe that if the State had filed the amended notice of appeal before it filed its brief, as Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) requires, the appeal would have been proper. I do not agree that that rule enlarges the substantive right to appeal. It merely enlarges the time within which a party may exercise the right.