Commonwealth's concession that the jury's acquittal meant appellant did not possess a gun collaterally estopped Commonwealth from any subsequent prosecution based on appellant's possession of a gun
How later courts described this case
- Commonwealth's concession that the jury's acquittal meant appellant did not possess a gun collaterally estopped Commonwealth from any subsequent prosecution based on appellant's possession of a gun
- jury acquittal on attempted homicide and assault barred subsequent trial for gun possession where the prosecutor conceded the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a gun
- Commonwealth’s concession that the jury’s acquittal meant [the] appellant did not possess a gun collaterally estopped Commonwealth from any subsequent prosecution based on [the] appellant’s possession of a gun
- McEwen, J., concurring with collateral estoppel analysis; Popovich, J. concurs in result
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McEWEN, Judge,
concurring.
Since I have such respect for the insight of my colleagues who compose the majority, I hasten to declare that I join them in the order which reverses the ruling of the trial *586 court. I am not convinced, however, that we need here proceed to so extended an illumination of the issues as provided by the majority. Thus it is that I simply observe that I agree that the appellant cannot be found to have effected a waiver of his right to raise the bar of collateral estoppel simply because he requested and was granted a severance. I also share the view that the Commonwealth is barred, by principles of collateral estoppel, from relitigating the common issue of ultimate fact essential to appellant's previous acquittal, namely, whether appellant was in possession of a firearm on April 22, 1990.
Ashe established that once an accused has been acquitted, a state cannot prosecute him a second time for a related offense having a common issue of ultimate fact essential to conviction which the previous acquittal had determined in his favor. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peluso, 481 Pa. 641 , 393 A.2d 344 (1978); Commonwealth v. Klinger, 264 Pa.Super. 21 , 398 A.2d 1036 (1979).
Commonwealth v. Harris, 400 Pa.Super. 12, 18 , 582 A.2d 1319, 1322 (1990). Cf: Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 27-29 , 540 A.2d 246, 252-253 (1988). Thus it is that I would preclude the Commonwealth from further prosecution of appellant.