concluding that "[i]t is virtually impossible to clinically describe the elements of the 'child abuse syndrome' [i.e., a "diagnostic or behavioral profile about sexually abused children"] with any realistic degree of specificity"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that "[i]t is virtually impossible to clinically describe the elements of the 'child abuse syndrome' [i.e., a "diagnostic or behavioral profile about sexually abused children"] with any realistic degree of specificity"
- holding inadmissible expert testimony about typical behavior patterns displayed by child victims of sexual abuse, reasoning it was easily understood by laypersons, did not require expert analysis, and invaded the jury’s province of determining witness credibility
- discussing the history of the "province-of-the-jury" prohibition, which " grew naturally out of the rule that expert testimony is admissible only if: ( 1) "the expert possessed a specialized skill in aparticular subject" and (2) "the expert's opinion could assist the jury"
- determining that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible if it shows a passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations of the defendant towards the victim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
As Mr. Justice Larsen notes, the majority, in its opinion, relies upon experts to reach the conclusion that the Commonwealth’s experts cannot provide testimony regarding a subject upon which other experts cannot agree; and, therefore, such testimony should be inadmissible based, I gather, on its unreliability as scientific proof. If the latter is the basis of the majority’s holding on the first issue, I agree with it for the nonce. However, I do not agree with the majority’s implication that there will never come a time when evidence of this type can become sufficiently reliable that it may be admitted.
Regarding the majority’s second issue, I believe the majority is ascribing to the average juror incredible sophistication regarding the effect of sexual abuse on the workings of a young mind. Moreover, to say, as the majority does, that “[a]ll of these reasons (i.e. reasons for delaying the report of such abuse) are easily understood by lay people and do not require expert analysis,” 1 “[t]his understanding (i.e. referring to why victims sometimes omit details) is well *188 within the common knowledge of jurors,” 2 and “[i]t is universally understood that children, especially young children, may not be able to recall with specificity when things occurred to them,” 3 basically trivializes an entire field of child psychology by implying that everybody already knows these facts as surely as they know that apples fall down.
Finally, it greatly concerns me that the majority would continue to permit, as no doubt they must, defense counsel to attack the credibility of the child-victim on all of these grounds, yet afford the Commonwealth no means to parry these defense tactics; this, despite the fact that on this point there is sufficient expert unanimity to conclude that such evidence is reliable. 4
Therefore, as to the majority’s holding on the second issue, I dissent and would allow expert testimony that did not specifically refer to the victim in the trial at hand.
Finally, regarding the cross appeal of Mr. Dunkle, I agree with the majority’s disposition.
. Maj. op. pp. 181-182.
. Maj. op. p. 184.
. Maj. op. p. 184.
. Indeed, if one takes the majority at its word, there is such unanimity that it has become accepted common knowledge.