"[O]ur holding expands the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to encompass certain findings not strictly essential to the final judgment in the prior action.... Such findings may be relied upon if it is clear that the issues underlying them were treated as essential to the prior case by the court and the party to be bound.... We deem this limited extension of the rule warranted in view of the strong and oft-stated public policy of limiting each litigant to one opportunity to try his case on the merits."
How later courts described this case
- "[O]ur holding expands the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to encompass certain findings not strictly essential to the final judgment in the prior action.... Such findings may be relied upon if it is clear that the issues underlying them were treated as essential to the prior case by the court and the party to be bound.... We deem this limited extension of the rule warranted in view of the strong and oft-stated public policy of limiting each litigant to one opportunity to try his case on the merits."
- "We now hold that one not a party to the first action may use a judgment in that action defensively against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action on the issues which the judgment decided"
- “[0]ne not a party to the first action may use a judgment in that action defensively against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action on the issues which the judgment decided”
- approving use of Bernhard by a defendant against a previously losing plaintiff
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Whittemore and Cutter, JJ.
(dissenting).
1. We concur in Mr. Justice Kirk’s view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel has no application to the present case. The doctrine, even between the same parties, applies only to those findings in the first litigation which were specifically made (or are necessarily implied in a general finding) and which are necessary to, or at least support, the first judgment. Cambria v. Jeffery, 307 Mass. 49, 50 . Restatement: Judgments, § 68 (1) and comment (o). James, Civil Procedure, § 11.21. Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.) §§ 0.442 [2], 0.443 [5], pp. 3855-3861, 3919-3929. Findings which were actually an alternative basis of decision in the earlier case may be within the rule. In the case before us, the finding of the trial judge in the first case (that the policy was in effect) does not seem to us to have been necessary to the ultimate decision in that case or to support it.
The usual rules governing collateral estoppel, in the long run, are likely to avoid unfairness and waste of judicial time. In most cases, as here, it is easy to ascertain the actual ground of the adjudication in a former case. Substantial *457 inquiry, however, may be required to discover what other issues of fact were litigated and decided otherwise than as the ground of relief.
2. We do not dispute the view of the majority that, in cases to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable, a defendant in a later action is not to be prevented from relying defensively upon a determination in a former action (in which the plaintiff in the later action was the plaintiff) merely because the defendant in the later action was not a party to the former action. To this extent, as a practical matter, the requirement of mutuality of estoppel has already been modified by this court. See Albernaz v. Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 339-340 (where, however, collateral estoppel was not applied offensively).