noting that, unlike in other jurisdictions, sentencing statute does not include “a specified differential between the minimum and maximum terms imposed” and refusing to imply one in the absence of such language
How later courts described this case
- noting that, unlike in other jurisdictions, sentencing statute does not include “a specified differential between the minimum and maximum terms imposed” and refusing to imply one in the absence of such language
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Brown, J.
(concurring in result). I am unable to agree with the broad proposition that “[i]mposition of a sentence of nine to ten years is a valid exercise of judicial authority and interferes with neither the power of the legislative branch to establish criminal sanctions nor of the executive *193 branch to grant parole.” See People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 689 (1972). Even if I could agree that this particular sentence (compare People v. Jacque, 131 Ill. App. 2d 365, 366 [1970], with People v. Dallas, 85 Ill. App. 3d 153 [1980]), was a valid exercise of judicial authority, I would still object because such a sentence violates the spirit of G. L. c. 279, § 24. In any event, it seems to me that it is prudent as well as humane for a sentencing judge to view G. L. c. 279, § 24, and G. L. c. 127, §§ 129 and 129A, in harmony.
I am, however, constrained to concur in the result reached here by the majority, as for all that appears the defendant raised no objection to the sentence at the time it was rendered. This is most likely so because, as the majority suggests, the sentence was the result of a negotiated plea agreement. The notion of a fully-bargained agreement is reinforced by the absence of anything in the defendant’s earlier appeal (see Commonwealth v. Hogan, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 236 , S.C. 379 Mass. 190 [1979] challenging the nine- to ten-year sentence he received at his first trial.