referring to “an entirely different connotation” of “specific intent” when applied to the doctrines of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication
How later courts described this case
- referring to “an entirely different connotation” of “specific intent” when applied to the doctrines of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication
- holding that the legislature’s use of the word “intentionally” when defining the crime of eluding police does not create a specific intent crime
- holding "[m]ere use of the term intentionally does not designate an additional mental state beyond that accompanying the act"
- doctrine of diminished responsibility may not be invoked as to general intent crimes
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DUNN, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I would reverse the aggravated assault conviction. The information and the specific jury instruction on aggravated assault failed to include an essential element of the crime. This was in spite of the fact that the error was called to the attention of the trial court at the time of trial.
I would affirm the convictions on the remaining charges.