stating “trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective. Absent such an opportunity, an appellate court should not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it” (citations and quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating “trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective. Absent such an opportunity, an appellate court should not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it” (citations and quotation marks omitted)
- holding that trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective; absent such opportunity, an appellate court should not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it
- explaining that "where counsel's reasons for failing to do something do not appear in the record," "an appellate court should not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was 'so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.'"
- holding that counsel’s performance was not deficient when he failed to ask any questions during voir dire because, under the appropriate circumstances, it can be a legitimate trial strategy to decline to ask questions already covered by the prosecution
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRICE, J.,
concurring in which COCHRAN, J., joined.
I agree with the majority that the record in this case is inadequate for us to resolve the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. I write separately to explain the difference between this case and Andrews v. State. 1
In Andrews, defense counsel failed to correct a misstatement of the law that was harmful to his client. 2 There was no possible reasonable trial strategy that would lead defense counsel to choose to remain silent. Thus, counsel’s reasons, if any, were unnecessary to resolve the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 3
. I have doubts about whether defense counsel in this case was pursuing a reasonable trial strategy when he failed to ask questions of the venire panel. Nonetheless, it is possible that there was some legitimate reason for counsel’s choice that is not apparent in the record before us. In this case, the record is inadequate for us to determine whether counsel was ineffective. Habeas proceedings are a more appropriate avenue in this case.
With these comments, I join the majority opinion.
.Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98 (Tex.Crim. App. 2005).
. Id. at 100 .
. Id. at 102 . See Matthews v. State, 350 S.C. 272, 276 , 565 S.E.2d 766, 768 (2002) (concluding that "[C]ounsel cannot assert trial strategy as a defense for failure to object to comments which constitute an error of law and are inherently prejudicial”).