noting that, in amending the mandatory supervision law, "the legislature intended to include all prior serious offenses. The changes were intended to . . . prevent those previously convicted of crimes ineligible for mandatory supervision from eligibility for any future conviction, regardless of the current offense"
How later courts described this case
- noting that, in amending the mandatory supervision law, "the legislature intended to include all prior serious offenses. The changes were intended to . . . prevent those previously convicted of crimes ineligible for mandatory supervision from eligibility for any future conviction, regardless of the current offense"
- discussing presents no valid basis for federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) & (d). IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Habeas corpus actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255 require a certificate of appealability to proceed on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1
- noting that courts do not apply the literal meaning of the words in a statute if the result would be absurd
- "In 1995, the legislature went further and made ineligible those inmates who had ever been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses. . . . Specifically, the bill analysis for House Bill 1433 of the 74th Regular Legislative Session, which amended Article 42.18, Section 8(c), supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to include all prior serious offenses. The changes were intended to Amend[] Section 8(c), Article 42.18, Code of Criminal Procedure, to prevent those previously convicted of crimes ineligible for mandatory supervision from eligibility for any future conviction, regardless of the current offense"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLER, P.J.,
dissenting.
The text of Texas Government Code § 508.149(a) does not include statutory precursors in the fist of offenses labeled ineligible for mandatory supervision. Under Boykin v. State, appellate courts are obligated to interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language, unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not possibly have intended. 1
There is nothing ambiguous about the list that § 508.149(a) provides: a number of offenses referenced by degree, code, and section number. If the Legislature had wanted to include statutory precursor offenses, it could have easily done so; it has done so in the past. 2
And failing to include statutory precursors does not lead to absurd results that the Legislature could not possibly have intended. The Court suggests that the Legislature probably did not mean to exclude them, but that is not the same as saying the Legislature could not possibly have intended such a result. It is often true that statutory changes are not applied to offenses committed before the change, and even when a statute does encompass *390 some offenses committed before its effective date, it is not irrational or absurd to suppose that the Legislature may have wanted to exclude earlier codifications of the offense from the newer scheme. In regard to enhancement allegations we have just recently said, “There is nothing absurd about a statutory interpretation which results in certain prior convictions being available for enhancement and others not being available.” 3 And so it is with precursor offenses.
In Griffith v. State, we did construe an enhancement statute to encompass certain statutory precursor offenses that were not listed in the text. 4 But that statute did contain a “catch-all” provision that broadly covered “similar” prior offenses committed in other states, necessarily encompassing both the current and prior versions of offenses committed in other states. 5 Consequently, failing to interpret the enhancement provision to encompass Texas statutory precursors would have produced the absurd result of including statutory precursors from every state but our own 6 The mandatory supervision statute at issue in this case, however, includes no catch-all provision regarding out-of-state offenses. 7
I am unwilling to read into the statute something that is plainly not there. I respectfully dissent.
. Getts v. State, 155 S.W.3d 153 (Tex.Crim. App.2005).
. Griffith v. State, 116 S.W.3d 782, 788 (Tex. Crim.App.2003) (the defendant's "argument would have more weight were it not for” other language in the statute).
. Id.
. Id.
. § 508.149(a).
. 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
. See Tex Pen.Code, § 49.09(c)(l)(C)-(E).