noting that the judgment for past-due alimony that the wife was attempting to enforce by garnishing the husband's pension was "made pursuant to the decisional domestic relations law of Pennsylvania"
How later courts described this case
- noting that the judgment for past-due alimony that the wife was attempting to enforce by garnishing the husband's pension was "made pursuant to the decisional domestic relations law of Pennsylvania"
- holding that ERISA's anti-alienation provision did not invalidate an order garnishing the former husband's ERISA benefits to satisfy an alimony arrearage
- holding that a QDRO may be entered to enforce a judgment for breach of an alimony agreement
- "It was pursuant to this decisional law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that the Stinners, in 1977, entered into the agreement for alimony."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*384 ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
In order to be considered as a qualified domestic relation order under Section 1056(3)(B)(i) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982), as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d) (1982 and Supp. Ill (1985)), a primary requisite is that the order give a spouse a specific interest in the subject pension proceeds. Because the majority fails to recognize this requirement, I must dissent.
Section 1056(3)(B)(i) states as follows:
(i) The term “qualified domestic relations order” means a domestic relations order—
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan, ... (Emphasis added)
Thus, before a spouse is entitled to receive any share of pension proceeds, that amount must be spelled out in the support order. For example, a court may order a spouse to pay $100 a month in alimony and 50% of that spouse’s pension. The specific designation regarding the pension enables the order to be recognized as a “qualified domestic relations order” as that term is defined under the Act.
In the appeal sub judice, the Appellant is attempting to enforce a support agreement which provided for the payment of $250 per week for life. The Appellant appears to have leaped over the first hurdle by having her support agreement incorporated into a court order. See Majority Slip Opinion at 2, fn. 1. This does not alleviate the Appellant’s second hurdle, however, which is to obtain a specific order assigning an interest in the pension plan. While the Appellant does have, at least arguably, a domestic relation order, the order of February 5, 1980, is not a “qualified domestic relations order.” Therefore, there is no authority under the Act to attach the Appellee’s pension.