noting that the supreme court “has consistently held that the imposition of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and the standard of review to determine whether a sentence is excessive is whether the trial court abused that discretion”
How later courts described this case
- noting that the supreme court “has consistently held that the imposition of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and the standard of review to determine whether a sentence is excessive is whether the trial court abused that discretion”
- explaining that reviewing courts in Illinois can reduce excessive sentences resulting from a trial court’s abuse of discretion
- finding that concurrent sentences of the defendant in that case “better serve[d] the spirit and purpose of the [Code]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
The defendant was convicted of murder, rape, and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 40 years, 20 years, and 15 years, respectively, for those crimes; the 40-year prison term for the murder conviction was to run consecutively to the sentences for the two other offenses, which were to run concurrently. The majority affirms the appellate court’s decision modifying the defendant’s sentences so that all three run concurrently. Because I do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing the defendant to a consecutive term for the murder conviction, I dissent.
There can be no doubt of the authority of a reviewing court in this State to reduce a sentence in a criminal case. (See 107 Ill. 2d R 615(b)(4).) But a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal unless it represents an abuse of discretion (People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 275-76 ; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153-54 ), and this court has consistently applied the abuse of discretion standard, either explicitly or implicitly, in reviewing orders imposing consecutive sentences (see People v. Holland (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 136, 161-63 ; People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 322-23 ; People v. Hicks (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 366, 373-76 ; People v. Pittman (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 169, 176-79 ; People v. Smith (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 298, 306-07 ). The principal question presented by this appeal is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing a consecutive prison term for the murder conviction, and I would hold that he did not.
As a preliminary matter, I do not agree with the majority that the appellate court implicitly applied the abuse of discretion standard in altering the trial judge’s sentencing order. In accepting the defendant’s argument that a consecutive sentence was excessive and was unnecessary for the protection of the public, the appellate court said: The appellate court did not expressly state that the trial judge’s sentencing order was an abuse of discretion, or even that the order was unsupported by the record. Instead, it appears that the appellate court simply substituted its own view of how the defendant should be sentenced. (Cf. People v. Perruquet (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 543, 549 (“After carefully considering the seriousness of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, we believe the maximum sentence in this case should be reduced to five years”), rev’d (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149 .) But despite the appellate court’s failure to apply the correct standard of review, it is not necessary that the cause be remanded to the appellate court for that purpose; the appellate court is in no better position than we are to review sentencing determinations, and the merits of the underlying issue have been fully addressed by the parties in their briefs to this court.
“We agree with O’Neal that he is not the type of criminal which should be subjected to the harsh penalty of consecutive sentences. Consecutive sentences should be imposed rarely and sparingly. (People v. Zadel (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 681 , 387 N.E.2d 1092 .) Based on O’Neal’s background including his family history and a lack of significant criminal behavior, and based on his youth, we believe that O’Neal’s sentences should be modified to run concurrently rather than consecutively.” (Slip op. at 7.)
The majority correctly notes that a consecutive sentence may not be imposed unless the sentencing judge “is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005—8—4(b); see People v. Pittman (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 169, 178 .) The record in this case establishes that the trial judge did believe that a consecutive sentence was necessary for the protection of the public. In explaining why he was imposing a consecutive term of imprisonment, the trial judge referred to the defendant’s role in the offenses here and to the defendant’s testimony that he had engaged in a series of armed robberies with the decedent. The judge stated:
“This defendant exhibited, according to his own testimony, he was a career and casual armed robber. He exhibited in this case a savage disposition. He combined here several of the most violent crimes known to the social order, and after he had kidnapped and raped this helpless woman in a diabolical scheme, he shot, murdered and robbed his partner in crime, all very much in keeping with the disposition as a career armed robber that he admits to.”
Notwithstanding that clear statement by the trial judge of his reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence in this case, the majority asserts that there is no indication that the judge adequately considered, in mitigation, the defendant’s age and his relationship with the murder victim, Hendricks. The majority also notes that the defendant grew up in impoverished surroundings, left school while in the eighth grade, overcame a drug problem, and, apart from the offenses here, had only one prior conviction, for robbery, for which he received a term of probation, later revoked.
I agree with the majority that those circumstances are relevant considerations in sentencing. But I do not believe that we may conclude that the trial judge failed to consider the information, or that he gave it inadequate weight.
The defendant was 19 years old when he committed the offenses here, and therefore he was eligible for the full range of criminal sanctions, including consecutive sentences, prescribed by Illinois law for adult offenders. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the trial judge’s decision to sentence the defendant to a consecutive term of imprisonment for the murder conviction reflects an inadequate consideration of the evidence regarding the defendant’s relationship with the murder victim. The defendants testimony on that subject was offered at trial in support of the defense theory that the defendant was in fear of the decedent and that the defendant shot and killed the decedent in self-defense while the two were struggling for a gun. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, though it was instructed on both the justifiable use of force and on the “unreasonable belief” form of voluntary manslaughter, in accordance with this court’s ruling in an earlier appeal involving the defendant. (See People v. O’Neal (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 399 .) Thus, the jury rejected the defendant’s claims of self-defense. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge expressed his agreement with the jury’s murder verdict, describing the evidence of the defendant’s guilt as “overwhelming.” The trial judge was in a superior position to weigh the conflicting evidence and to gauge the credibility of the witnesses. In imposing sentence, the judge was certainly free to reject or assign little weight to the defendant’s uncorroborated, self-serving testimony regarding his relationship with the decedent; the trial judge may have found that evidence no more believable than the defendant’s testimony denying that he committed rape.
The trial judge had before him the parties’ evidence concerning the commission of the offenses in this case, as well as all the other information regarding the defendant’s background and home life, and I do not believe that we may now say that the trial judge did not adequately consider the myriad circumstances relevant to the sentencing process. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence in this case, and I would not intrude on his informed decision.