where the appellate court overturned a conviction of attempted theft by deception of a commercial lease, but did not address whether a lease was property under section 15 — 1
How later courts described this case
- where the appellate court overturned a conviction of attempted theft by deception of a commercial lease, but did not address whether a lease was property under section 15 — 1
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING
JUSTICE WOODWARD delivered the opinion of the court:
In his petition for rehearing, the defendant contends that the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in light of the fact that this court reversed his conviction of attempted theft by deception while affirming his conviction of forgery.
Defendant raises this issue for the first time in his petition for rehearing, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (113 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)). Defendant points out that he sought such relief in the “Conclusion” part of his appellant’s brief. Yet nowhere in his brief did he present any argument or cite any authority in support of the granting of such relief and, thus, waived the issue of a new sentencing hearing. 113 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
Assuming, arguendo, that we were to consider the merits of the resentencing issue, we are of the opinion that a new sentencing hearing is not required here. Where a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses, reversal of one conviction does not per se require that the defendant be resentenced on the remaining conviction or convictions, as long as the record shows that the trial court considered the offenses separately and sentenced the defendant separately on each offense. (People v. Kosanovich (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 748, 750 .) Defendant correctly notes that at the sentencing hearing the trial court did not delineate between the two offenses. However, the trial court did state that a jail term was necessary in this case to protect the public and imposed the same four-year sentence for each offense. We are convinced that the sentences imposed in this case were not so interrelated as to require a new sentencing hearing.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
UNVERZAGT, P.J., and REINHARD, J., concur.