holding that SVP defendants are not similarly situated to other civil detainees because "persons subject to [Illinois' SVPA] possess characteristics which set them apart from the greater class of persons who fall within [Illinois' civil commitment statutes], and such persons present different societal problems"
How later courts described this case
- holding that SVP defendants are not similarly situated to other civil detainees because "persons subject to [Illinois' SVPA] possess characteristics which set them apart from the greater class of persons who fall within [Illinois' civil commitment statutes], and such persons present different societal problems"
- explaining that SVP statute defines sexually violent offense to include “first degree murder, if it is determined by the agency with jurisdiction to have been sexually motivated ... ”
- noting that “[t]he provisions of the [SVP] Act are triggered when a defendant who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a sexually violent offense, or been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity is nearing release or discharge from custody.”
- noting that involuntary confinement is permissible under the Act “where the defendant presently suffers from a mental disorder and the disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence in the future” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent 1 failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) violates either the equal protection clause or the due process clause. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s decision to address other arguments not raised in respondent’s brief. The majority addresses respondent’s contentions that the Act contravenes the prohibition against double jeopardy; violates ex post facto principles; and violates article I, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution. Although respondent raised those arguments at the trial court level, he abandoned them on appeal when he failed to include them in his brief. These arguments therefore are waived (see 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 341(e)(7), (f)), and this court should not address them.
In the majority opinion, David Samuelson is referred to as “defendant.” Because this is a civil commitment proceeding and not a criminal case, I will refer to him as “respondent.”