holding that the liability created by the Illinois Dramshop Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 43, ¶ 135) was "`exclusive, sui generis nontort liability'" that did not satisfy the requirement of the Illinois Contribution Act (quoting Hopkins v. Powers, 113 Ill.2d 206, 211, 100 Ill.Dec. 579, 497 N.E.2d 757 (1986))
How later courts described this case
- holding that the liability created by the Illinois Dramshop Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 43, ¶ 135) was "`exclusive, sui generis nontort liability'" that did not satisfy the requirement of the Illinois Contribution Act (quoting Hopkins v. Powers, 113 Ill.2d 206, 211, 100 Ill.Dec. 579, 497 N.E.2d 757 (1986))
- holding that the liability created by the Illinois Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 43, ¶ 135) was “ ‘exclusive, sui generis nontort liability’ ” that did not satisfy the requirement of the Illinois Contribution Act (quoting Hopkins v. Powers, 113 Ill. 2d 206, 211 (1986))
- holding that the liability created by the Illinois Dramshop Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 43, ¶ 135
- because liability under the Dramshop Act is nontort liability, no cause of action exists against a dramshop for contribution under the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 302(a) (providing for contribution only “where [two] or more persons are subject to liability in tort” (emphasis added)))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE SIMON, specially concurring:
I continue to believe that the decision in Hopkins v. Powers (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 206 , that dramshops are not “liable in tort” under the Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 302(a)), and therefore not subject to an action for contribution is incorrect. (See Hopkins, 113 Ill. 2d at 212-19 (Goldenhersh and Simon, JJ., dissenting).) The result of the application of such a decision is even more egregious here than it was in Hopkins because in this case it is not the intoxicated person who is attempting to get contribution from the dramshop, but rather, the person seeking contribution is one who has been sued by the intoxicated person. Unfortunately, the holding in Hopkins controls the outcome in this case, and I reluctantly concur in the decision of the court.