stating that, because all the orders of the MCAD are subject to judicial review, “the employer is not faced with a denial of access to the judicial system, but rather a postponement of judicial adjudication at the complainant’s option until after the commission has issued a preliminary determination and ordered a remedy”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, because all the orders of the MCAD are subject to judicial review, “the employer is not faced with a denial of access to the judicial system, but rather a postponement of judicial adjudication at the complainant’s option until after the commission has issued a preliminary determination and ordered a remedy”
- affirming finding that employer did not incur more than de minimis cost to accommodate plaintiff’s religious needs, in action under both Title VII and G. L. c. 151B, § 4 [1A]
- affirming finding that employee was discriminated against on basis of religion and remanding for recalculation of award of back pay
- noting other contexts in which control over access to courts resides in one party
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Lynch, J.
(dissenting in part). I do not agree that the commission correctly added interest from the commencement of the proceeding to the award of damages for loss of pay. In upholding the commission’s award the court relies on College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n *585 Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156 (1987), in which I dissented, although I did not reach the interest issue. To the extent that College-Town supports the award of interest, I depart from that portion of the opinion as well. Since interest is compensation for the use of money wrongfully withheld, logic compels the conclusion that a claimant is not entitled to interest on a sum until payment of that sum is overdue. It follows, therefore, that an award of damages for lost wages should not properly include interest until such time as the wages would have been earned but for the wrongful conduct of the defendant. No matter how broad the remedial power of the commission, it cannot convert interest into something it is not or refashion the concept to its own liking. The commission has adequate powers to remedy wrongful discrimination without corrupting the meaning of such a universally understood term.