holding the depraved sexual instinct exception is no longer recognized in Indiana
How later courts described this case
- holding the depraved sexual instinct exception is no longer recognized in Indiana
- overruling Indiana’s prior use of the “depraved sexual instinct exception” and citing cases from other jurisdictions both adopting and rejecting the exception
- evidence of prior sexual misconduct may be admissible as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake "despite its tendency to show bad character or criminal propensity, if it makes the existence of an element of the crime charged more probable than it would be without such evidence"
- expressly abandoning the depraved sexual instinct rule in favor of Rule 404(b)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Hoglund v. State, 2012 Ind. LEXIS 22 (2012)
600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992) and overruled by Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230
Questioned by Shanks v. State, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 1335 (1994)
We admit that this tends to cast doubt upon our interpretation of Lannan that prior sex crimes are not relevant to the determination of the defendant’s guilt.
The opinion
GIVAN, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion. I strongly disagree with the majority's abolition of the depraved sexual instinct rule. The majority opinion very accurately has set forth the reasons for the adoption of this rule and the long history of its usage in this State. I find no need to repeat the statements made in the majority opinion. Suffice it to say that based upon those reasons given, I believe the necessity to protect children from the devastating harm of molestation justifies the invocation of the rule.
I fully recognize, as stated by the majority, that in most cases the evidence of prior conduct probably will come in under accepted rules which the majority leaves intact. However, I do not believe this fact justifies the abrogation of the rule. I believe a jury is entitled to know that a defendant in a child molesting case has a history of sexual deviate conduct because of the heinous nature of the crime and the possible unbeliev *1342 ability of a small child. To me, the abrogation of this rule is an erosion, albeit small, of the protection of children. I would not diminish that protection one iota.
I concur with the majority in their affir-mance of the conviction of appellant.