holding that the United States and Maine constitutions compel the conclusion that “an indigent parent or parents against whom a custody petition is instituted ... is entitled to have counsel appointed at the State’s expense unless the right to counsel is knowingly waived”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the United States and Maine constitutions compel the conclusion that “an indigent parent or parents against whom a custody petition is instituted ... is entitled to have counsel appointed at the State’s expense unless the right to counsel is knowingly waived”
- ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it
- discussing the natural and fundamental rights of parents to the custody of their children
- attorney assigned to indigent parents in civil neglect proceeding because full panoply of traditional weapons of state are marshalled against defendant parents
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled implicitly by Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
While many state courts have concluded that due process requires counsel for a natural parent who risks losing custody of his or her child, see, e.g., Danforth v. State Department of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973), implicitly overruled by Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (federal constitutional grounds overruled in part by Lassiter), the United States Supreme Court has held that not even a natural parent has a due…
The opinion
WERNICK, Justice
(separately concurring).
In the present case I join in both the opinion of Justice Pomeroy for the Court and Chief Justice Dufresne’s separate concurrence.
Since I find no inconsistency in such attitude, notwithstanding that the Chief Justice’s concurrence is predicated on his belief that he “must renew the message conveyed by ... [his] dissent . ” in S**** S**** v. State, Me., 299 A.2d 560 (1973), a case in which I was with the Court majority, I find it desirable to add a brief explanation of my view.
In my judgment the majority in S**** S**** v. State did not disagree with the Chief Justice’s statement of principle that
“constitutional due process requires, to support a finding of delinquency for juvenile conduct which in adults would not be criminal, . . ., that the statute prohibiting the juvenile conduct must define the juvenile offense in terms of sufficient specificity as to furnish necessary intelligible standards to guide the child, his parents, the police and the courts.”
This proposition was acknowledged by the majority and formed the basic premise of its rationale. In S**** S**** v. State the disagreement between the majority and the Chief Justice in dissent was, therefore, not a difference as to the content of controlling principle but was rather only a difference in opinion as to the application of the principle to a particular factual situation.
I take the precaution of emphasizing this point to ensure that there shall be no misunderstanding of the fundamental import of the decision in S**** S**** v. State,— in particular to avoid any possibility that that case may be looked upon as a repudiation, rather than an acceptance, of the proposition that “constitutional due process” is operative in the governmental control of juvenile misconduct. The decision in S**** S**** v. State is that there are compellingly important differences between the misconduct of juveniles and the criminal behavior of adults — as a result of which the application in the two separate contexts of the same general principles of “constitutional due process” rationally may, and often will, produce differences in the specific requirements for each situation.