holding that the plaintiffs stated an IIED claim where radio show hosts, paid to promote the plaintiffs’ fundraiser, “ridiculed” the plaintiffs by denying that they suffered from a severe medical condition and that their fundraising for that condition was a scam, “the complaint allege[d] that the defendants’ conduct, in making and broadcasting the statements, was done with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress,” and “the complaint allege[d] … that the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a proximate result”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the plaintiffs stated an IIED claim where radio show hosts, paid to promote the plaintiffs’ fundraiser, “ridiculed” the plaintiffs by denying that they suffered from a severe medical condition and that their fundraising for that condition was a scam, “the complaint allege[d] that the defendants’ conduct, in making and broadcasting the statements, was done with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress,” and “the complaint allege[d] … that the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a proximate result”
- concluding radio announcers’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous where they broadcast derogatory remarks about plaintiff’s wife and child with neurofibromatosis throughout the larger Chicago area and implied they had deformed heads and were hideous
- holding that radio disc jockeys’ derogatory statements constituted defamation per se and supported a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
- requiring that, to prove a false light claim, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendants acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether [they] were true or false”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Schivarelli v. CBS, INC., 333 Ill. App. 3d 755 (2002)
By contrast, Ms. Zekman gave no similar factual context for her statement that Mr. Schivarelli was "cheating" the city; accordingly, Kolegas and Kumaran are inapposite.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
I agree with the conclusion reached in this case. I write separately to record my concerns with the majority’s analysis in part III respecting the allegations of reckless infliction of emotional distress.
The linchpin of the conclusion that the element of extreme and outrageous conduct was satisfied by the complaint’s allegations is the fact that the Disas were able to unilaterally broadcast their remarks. (154 Ill. 2d at 22.) The majority finds that the considerable public reach permitted by the positions the Disas enjoyed in the media transformed the offensive remarks into extreme and outrageous conduct. (154 Ill. 2d at 22-23.) Were the same remarks made privately, the majority reservedly observes, “we might be more inclined to consider them ‘mere insults.’ ” 154 Ill. 2d at 22.
The majority’s observation points to a potential problem for similar cases in the future. With introduction of the concept of an audience in the determination of whether remarks constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, it may seem to matter little that what is said may be merely insulting. It is difficult to separate the content from the circumstances of any unwelcome remarks broadcasted publicly. The more extensive that broadcast the more extreme and outrageous the remarks, otherwise nonactionable if made privately, appear. That may invite a less than rigorous analysis of the content of what is broadcast.
Comment e of section 46 of the Restatement of Torts (Restatement (Second) of Torts §46 (1965)) cautions that, where the conduct is associated with abuse of a position of power, liability generally has not been recognized for mere insults. (Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment e, at 74 (1965).) When evaluating a complaint’s allegations pursuant to a section 2 — 615 motion, it is essential that the public nature of the objected-to remarks does not overshadow a critical analysis of their content.
Although the majority expresses some reservation, I believe such an analysis shows the alleged remarks to be something more than mere insults. Tim and Beth Disa’s comments are easily characterized as hurtful, unfeeling, and cruel. The remarks evidence a plain ignorance of and disregard for the condition afflicting Donna and Christopher Kolegas. Neurofibromatosis — Elephant man disease — conjures images of grotesque physical deformity. It would certainly be an unfortunate state of affairs if such ridicule about a woman and child afflicted with the disease did not generate resentment against the Disas sufficient to cause an average member of the community to exclaim, “Outrageous!”