The opinion
DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). In Livesey v. Copps Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 577, 581 , 280 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Ct. App. 1979), we adopted the rule that the court of appeals *498 is bound by prior decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. We followed this rule in State v. Olsen, 99 Wis. 2d 572, 583 , 299 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Ct. App. 1980), State v. Beno, 110 Wis. 2d 40 , 47 n. 2, 327 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Ct. App. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 116 Wis. 2d 122 , 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984), and State v. Cooper, 117 Wis. 2d 30, 36 , 344 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Ct. App. 1983). I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s decision to overrule the supreme court’s determination in In Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens, 106 Wis. 2d 244, 253 , 316 N.W.2d 362, 366 (1982). In that case the court said: “We agree with the court of appeals in ruling that the one-year limitation does not apply to actions brought under sec. 806.07(1) (d), Stats. Motions claiming that the judgment is void are permissible if brought within ‘a reasonable time.’ ” 1
In its decision, the majority writes at page 497: “We conclude that the ‘reasonable time’ requirement of sec. 806.07(2), Stats., does not apply to void judgments or orders.” The majority’s reason for concluding that the Tax Liens decision was wrong is that the supreme court did not adequately consider whether Rule 806.07(1) (d) effected a change in longstanding case law. This is an insufficient reason for deviating from precedent. In State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 533 , 348 N.W.2d 159, 163 (1984), the court said: “Had the court of appeals adhered to precedent, as it is required to do, this review would not have been necessary. It is apparent that [the court of appeals] thought the decision of this court in Zdiarstek was wrong; and, hence, it attempted to avoid what is a clear and binding precedent.”
Rule 806.07(1) (d), Stats., was adopted by supreme court order. See 67 Wis. 2d 726 (1976). The plain meaning of Rule 806.07 (2) requires a motion brought under *499 Rule 806.07(1) (d) to be brought within a reasonable time. The primary function of the supreme court is to oversee and implement the statewide development of the law. State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665 , 307 N.W.2d 200, 216 (1981). It is therefore more appropriate that the supreme court decide whether its decision in Tax Liens should be modified so as to reach the conclusion adopted here by the majority.
Were I writing for the majority, I would conclude that we should follow the Tax Liens decision.
Because the majority concludes that a motion brought under Rule 806.07(1) (d), Stats., need not be brought within a reasonable time, it does not reach the question whether plaintiffs’ motions were brought within a reasonable time. In Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Krist, 104 Wis. 2d 381, 394 , 311 N.W.2d 624, 631 (1981), the court said that a trial court’s determination under Rule 806.07(1) (a) is discretionary. We therefore will not reverse that determination unless the trial court abused its discretion. Though voidness is a mixed question of fact and law, the introductory paragraph of Rule 806.07 makes relief from judgments and orders discretionary. I therefore conclude that a trial court has discretion to grant or deny relief under Rule 806.07(1) (d).
In three cases, the supreme court considered whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to vacate judgments. In Rhodes v. Terry, 91 Wis. 2d 165, 177 , 280 N.W.2d 248, 253 (1979), the court found no abuse of discretion where a trial court refused to vacate a judgment where the motion for relief was brought less than seven months after defendant knew a judgment had been taken against him. In Charolais Breeding Ranches v. Wiegel, 92 Wis. 2d 498, 517 , 285 N.W.2d 720, 729 (1979), the court found no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to vacate a judgment made 60 days after the judgment was entered. In Krist, 104 Wis. 2d at 384 , *500 311 N.W.2d at 626 , a ten month period between notice of entry of judgment and motion to vacate was involved. The court found no abuse of discretion where the trial court refused to vacate the judgment.
In these cases, plaintiffs had notice of the orders of dismissal in late 1979 or early 1980, but did not bring a motion to vacate until October 4, 1982. The one and a half to two year period present in these cases substantially exceeds the 60-day, seven month and ten month periods involved in Charoláis, Rhodes and Krist . However, the trial court must also consider the particular facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the reasonable time requirement was satisfied. State ex rel. Lewandowski v. Callaway, 118 Wis. 2d 165, 175 , 346 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1984). Though the trial court gave adequate reasons for entering its orders, it gave no reasons why it refused to vacate them. However, we are obliged to uphold a discretionary decision of a trial court if we can conclude ah initio that there are facts of record which would support the trial court’s decision had discretion been exercised on the basis of those facts. Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 237 , 330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (1983).
The facts of record show that one of the plaintiffs is an attorney. An attorney should know that trial courts have an obligation to dismiss stale cases. The other plaintiff is a student. They began their actions at nearly the last possible moment, avoiding a statute of limitations bar by 13 days. Rosemary Neylan then did nothing until her case was dismissed on February 8, 1977, nearly three years later. Kathleen Neylan stipulated that the caption to her action could be amended. She ignored defendant’s request for production of documents made February 11, 1977. She claimed loss of income, but in a November 17, 1976, deposition had no information to support her claim. She agreed to produce some docu *501 mentation for her income loss, but did not, necessitating a second request for production of documents. Other than neglecting to produce documents, Kathleen Neylan also did nothing until her case was dismissed. Her attorney did not file an affidavit or give testimony showing what had been done to bring the case to trial. There is no record of any action in either case, other than that already decribed, until they were dismissed.
Had the court used these facts as reasons why it refused to vacate the orders, we would affirm its orders because they would have been based on relevant facts, the court would have used a rational process and reached a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15 , 320 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1982). The court did not address plaintiffs’ argument on appeal that a refusal to vacate the orders denied them due process of law because plaintiffs did not make that argument in the trial court.
“Even if the evidence favoring a default judgment is slight, ... an appellate court should affirm unless it was impossible for the trial court to grant the judgment in the exercise of its discretion.” Martin v. Griffin, 117 Wis. 2d 438, 442 , 344 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1984). The same principle applies here. I conclude that the record supports a finding that plaintiffs’ motions to vacate were not brought within a reasonable time.
The majority does not state why it concludes the orders were void. Though my analysis of the issues in these cases makes inquiry into voidness unnecessary, I question whether the orders were void. The supreme court examined the voidness doctrine in Krist, 104 Wis. 2d at 390 , 311 N.W.2d at 629 , and said: “The final principle to be derived from [Frankfurth v. Anderson, 61 Wis. 107 , 20 N.W. 662 (1884)] is that errors of the court do not generally render a judgment void so long as the court which renders the judgment has jurisdiction *502 of the person of the defendant as well as of the subject matter.” (Footnote omitted.)
Because plaintiffs brought these actions, the court had personal jurisdiction over them. In Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d 171, 177 , 313 N.W.2d 790, 793 (1982), the court said citing Krist : “If a court has power, i.e. subject matter jurisdiction, to entertain a particular type of action, its judgment is not void even though entertaining it was erroneous and contrary to the statute.” The circuit court had the power to entertain personal injury actions, giving the court subject matter jurisdiction. 2 Using the test for voidness outlined in Krist , I conclude the orders were not void.
Though the orders were entered pursuant to statute, and the trial court’s refusal to vacate them was not an abuse of discretion, we cannot stop with a statutory analysis if a constitutional attack on the orders was made in the trial court. Judgments entered contrary to due process are void. Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis. 2d 575, 587 , 338 N.W.2d 861, 868 (Ct. App. 1983).
The majority does not consider whether orders, void because entered contrary to due process, are subject to the same appellate analysis as orders or judgments void *503 for reasons other than due process infirmities. Its conclusion is that a trial court must vacate void orders, and the context of its conclusion suggests that orders entered contrary to due process must be vacated. This conclusion is contrary to the holding in Wengerd, 114 Wis. 2d at 587 , 338 N.W.2d at 868 , where we held that judgments entered contrary to due process need not be vacated if the error is waived by the party against whom the judgment is taken.
The Supreme Court has concluded that dismissal of an action without prior notice does not necessarily violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962), the Court considered this question. It said:
Accordingly, when circumstances make such action appropriate, a District Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute even without affording notice of its intention to do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting. Whether such an order can stand on appeal depends not on power but on whether it was within the permissible range of the court’s discretion.
The Court noted that the case was six years old when dismissed, plaintiff knew of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which permits a district court to dismiss an action for failure to comply with a court order, and that Rule 60 (b) of the federal rules provided a means by which the court’s dismissal could be reviewed.
These cases were three years old when dismissed and seven years old when plaintiffs asked the court to vacate its orders of dismissal. Plaintiffs’ attorney should have known of Rule 805.03, Stats., which is based generally on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Rule 806.07, Stats., is substantially equivalent to Federal Rule 60 (b). Plaintiff in Link and these cases delayed by failing to *504 answer interrogatories, and made no effort to bring the matters to trial. The similarities between Link and these cases lead to the conclusion that plaintiffs’ conduct coupled with the Rule 806.07 remedy permitted the trial court to dismiss these cases without offending due process. 3
Finally, I disagree with the majority opinion because it considers an issue not raised in the trial court. This is an error-correcting court. State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665 , 307 N.W.2d 200, 216-17 (1981). We are burdened with an ever increasing backlog of cases. If this court insists that litigants present issues to trial courts before asking us to consider those issues, we will obviate the need for many appeals. As a general rule, issues not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 171 , 288 N.W.2d 129, 138-39 (1980). There is a good reason for this rule: If a trial court is asked to address an issue, it will usually make a correct decision. This is shown in our dispositions; affirmances substantially outnumber reversals. A correct trial court decision is less likely to be appealed because most appellate counsel are disinclined to pursue what their research shows is likely to be a losing cause. I would not consider the due process arguments raised in these cases.
I do not distinguish between judgments and orders as those terms are used in this opinion.
See Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176-78 , 313 N.W.2d 790, 793 (1982), for a discussion of the need for further inquiry into the competence of a court to render a valid judgment. Under the definition adopted by the court and found in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments sec. 50 comment a (1980), I conclude the circuit court had competence to enter the order. That comment to the Restatement provides :
a. Requirement of competency of the court. . . . Although a State has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it may not have given to a particular court or it may not have given to any of its courts power to entertain the action. In such a case the court has no “competency” to render a valid judgment. The court has no power to render a valid judgment, not because the State lacks power but because it has not conferred power upon the court.
A postdismissal hearing differs little from a predismissal hearing. In both instances the court considers whether a plaintiff’s actions show a lack of concern for the claim. Thus, had the trial court held a predismissal hearing and dismissed the case, plaintiffs’ due process arguments would evaporate. A trial court considers the same factors in arriving at a decision to dismiss stale actions whether it makes this decision before or after the order of dismissal. The court’s action cannot logically depend upon whether the motion was heard before or after the order of dismissal.