holding that the evidence did not support an assertion that Whittington's expression was political and holding that "we must apply rationality review in determining whether the state could reasonably have concluded that Whittington's expressive activity, because of its volume, was an 'abuse' of the right to speak or was, in other words, a threat to peace, safety, and well-being"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the evidence did not support an assertion that Whittington's expression was political and holding that "we must apply rationality review in determining whether the state could reasonably have concluded that Whittington's expressive activity, because of its volume, was an 'abuse' of the right to speak or was, in other words, a threat to peace, safety, and well-being"
- finding expression not political where the defendant “protested that he had not done anything and that the other witnesses were lying” because the “statements involve the conduct of private individuals, not state action”
- noting that "[a]s we indicated in Price , the approach under § 9 might be different were the challenger's activity not pure expression-that is, were it mixed with non-expressive conduct"
- noting that the focus of the free speech clause is on the “restrictive impact of state action” and that the clause is triggered when the “state imposes a direct and significant burden on a person’s opportunity to speak his or her mind”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring in result.
I share some, but not all, of Justice Dickson's concerns with the analysis of Article I, § 9, of the Indiana Constitution contained in Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993). In particular, I find troubling Price's implication that, while protection for political speech is "enshrine[d]" in Article I, § 9, other types of speech-religious, literary, scientific, artistic, for example-must apparently look elsewhere in the Indiana Bill of Rights for protection. This does not seem to square with the fact that Article I, § 9, covers "the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever."
At the same time, I agree with both the majority and Justice Dickson that Mr. Whit-tington's rights under Article I, § 9, were not implicated by his prosecution for disorderly conduct here and so concur in result, leaving the development of the protections afforded speech under the Indiana Constitution to future cases.