declining to A-2715-23 31 extend Pierce "to failure to hire or promote situations"
How later courts described this case
- declining to A-2715-23 31 extend Pierce "to failure to hire or promote situations"
- holding that independent contractors are not protected under the wrongful discharge doctrine
- explaining the core of the bribery statute as special interests paying “a public official to control his vote”
- emphasizing that the Pierce exception was recognized “only after balancing the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Re/Max of New Jersey, Inc. v. Wausau Insurance Companies, 316 N.J. Super. 514 (1998)
In doing so, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that the sales agents are independent contractors pursuant to the dictates of MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 677 A.2d 162 (1996).
The opinion
STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
With four separate opinions, there is a good chance that the casual reader might have difficulty understanding what all the fuss is about. A fifth opinion might clarify things a bit.
MacDougall, a Chester councilman, voted in favor of an ordinance regulating parking in the town’s business section. Weichert, his employer, fired him allegedly because Merriam, an important client, was unhappy with MacDougall’s vote and apparently threatened to take his business elsewhere unless MaeDougall was terminated. MacDougall sued Weichert and Merriam.
The majority of the Court is uncertain about whether MaeDougall has a cause of action. They remand the case to the trial court, with instructions to that court to take testimony and determine whether ‘Weichert’s conduct * * * (in firing MacDou *445 gall) was based on * * * relationships that would constitute an unpermissible conflict of interest,” (apparently directing the trial court to focus on whether MacDougall, had he known of those relationships when he voted, would have had a disqualifying conflict of interest.) If so, the majority presumably would recognize a cause of action. Ante at 403, 677 A.2d at 173. The logic of tying MacDougall’s cause of action to the resolution of that hypothetical conflict-of-interest inquiry is elusive, but the majority insists on placing that hurdle in the path of MacDougall’s claim.
The Chief Justice and I view the case in simpler terms. As we see it, MacDougall allegedly got fired for an honest vote because a client that was unhappy put pressure on his boss to get rid of him. Under those facts, we would hold that his discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy — the mandate that public officials can neither be bribed nor unreasonably pressured to influence their official action. We believe the Court should state emphatically and unequivocally that, assuming those facts are proved, MacDougall can recover damages from Weiehert and Merriam. A New Jersey public official who casts an honest vote should not be subject to discharge by an employer seeking to appease a disgruntled customer.
This ease raises no profound issues of social policy as might be presented by the case of a storekeeper whose clerk-councilman employee opposes a planned parenthood clinic that the storekeeper’s customers favor. As the Chief Justice acknowledges, his views in this case do not imply that the clerk in that hypothetical ease would have a cause of action if the storekeeper discharged him. Ante at 433, 677 A.2d at 188.
This appeal poses a stark choice for the Court, with troublesome implications if the question were to be presented in a different context. Those implications do not alter our responsibility to decide this case clearly and decisively. The Chief Justice has it exactly right, and I join his opinion.
O’HERN, J., concurs in result.
*446 For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 4.
For reversal/remandment on other grounds — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice STEIN — 2.
For affirmance — Justice POLLOCK — 1.