The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Like Mr. Justice Castille, I believe that because the 1967 amendments removed the constitutional text supports ing the decisions in Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568 , 3 A.2d 701 (1938), and Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O’Neill, 368 Pa. 369 , 83 A.2d 382 (1951), those cases cannot be used as a foundation for analyzing the question today. Apart from that text, I see no basis for the courts to inquire into the “reasonableness” of the legislative determination to extend to veterans a preference in employment and promotions.
I also disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Article I, Section 17. That section provides that no law shall be passed “making irrevocable any grant of special privileges.” Simply put, this means that the legislature may not attempt to prevent future legislatures from revoking any privilege that has been granted; privileges are always subject to being altered or revoked at a later time. It is irrelevant that the Act itself does not contain conditional factors or events by which the preference can be revoked, so long as it does not purport to prevent such revocation.
The majority also errs in directing attention to the fact that a person’s status as a veteran is “not subject to revocation.” Article I, Section 17 prevents the legislature from making a privilege irrevocable. The privilege granted by the Veterans’ Preference Act is not one’s status as a veteran, it is the advantage in securing employment or promotion. The Act does not attempt to assure that this advantage shall exist in perpetuity, never to be withdrawn. The General Assembly *507 can revoke it at any time by repealing the Act. Therefore the Act does not violate Article 1, Section 17.
CASTILLE, J., joins this dissenting Opinion.