explaining that, where there is a serious evidentiary Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1233 | February 21, 2025 Page 13 of 15 dispute, it is reversible error not to give a tendered instruction on a lesser- included offense
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, where there is a serious evidentiary Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1233 | February 21, 2025 Page 13 of 15 dispute, it is reversible error not to give a tendered instruction on a lesser- included offense
- explaining that, “if a trial court has determined that an alleged lesser included offense is either inherently or factually included in the crime charged, it must look at the evidence presented in the case by both parties”
- holding a crime to be a lesser included offense if its elements are “factually” subsumed within another offense
- holding that an offense is factually lesser included “[i]f the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring.
If a lesser offense is "inherently" or "factually" included in a charged crime, and a prima facie case of the charged crime has been presented by the State, the State or the defendant should be entitled to an instruction on such lesser offense. In my opinion, long held, Jones v. State (1982), Ind, 488 N.E.2d 972 (DeBruler, J., concurring in result), the additional requirement of having trial judges also evaluate the evidence, lacks significant value in the administration of the criminal law. The requirement itself rests upon the mistaken belief that unless judges restrict the use of lesser included offense instructions, based upon each particular judge's view of the value of the State's prima facie case, juries will seize upon such instructions and render evil "compromise verdicts." Hester v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 284 , 815 N.E.2d 351 ; Hash v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 692 , 284 N.E.2d 770 . I did not share in this distrust of juries as a trial judge, and I do not share it now as a judge of this Court. Juries have the right to disbelieve all or any part of the State's prima facie case. Juries strive mightily to follow the law as given them by the court. Very occasionally, a jury may act out of passion or prejudice. Such rare events do not justify the costs to the criminal justice system of regular judicial intervention of the sort required by this rule.
I renew consideration of this bedrock matter, although I deem myself bound by stare decisis to interpret and uphold the rule, because this case is undoubtedly a turning point case.