Opinion

In Re Marriage of Adams

  • 348 Ill. App. 3d 340
  • 284 Ill. Dec. 124
  • 809 N.E.2d 246
  • 2004 Ill. App. LEXIS 690
Court
Appellate Court of Illinois
Filed
Apr 30, 2004
Status
Published
Author
Schmidt
On the bench
Barry, Schmidt
Cited by
15 cases

“To establish a substantial change in circumstances, the petitioner must show an increase in the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay and an increase in the needs of the child since the court’s previous order.”

How later courts described this case

  • “To establish a substantial change in circumstances, the petitioner must show an increase in the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay and an increase in the needs of the child since the court’s previous order.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring:

I concur, but write separately because I feel compelled to comment on the circumstances of the default judgment that was entered in this case. Steve’s attorney, Ronald Stradt, has his offices in Springfield, Illinois, a considerable distance from Whiteside County. Carol’s attorney filed notice of the March 18 hearing on March 13, three working days before the hearing date. Stradt, apparently a busy trial attorney, was unaware of the notice of hearing until March 15, the Friday before the hearing. It seems clear from the record that Carol’s attorney did not consult with Stradt before scheduling the hearing. Carol’s attorney could have prevented the waste of resources that occurred as a result of the entry of the default judgment by setting a mutually agreeable date for the hearing, or by agreeing to a continuance after receiving the motion for extension of time and telephone message from Stradt. Instead, he proceeded with the hearing and sought and secured a default judgment. Once the trial court became aware that Stradt had, before the March 18 hearing, filed a motion seeking to continue the hearing, it appropriately vacated the default judgment.

In the interest of promoting civility in the legal profession, I note that a simple professional courtesy would have avoided the needless litigation related to the entry of the default judgment in this case.

Certainly, Carol’s attorney did not violate any rules of court in setting the motion for hearing as he did. Maybe that is part of the bigger problem. The Fifth Judicial Circuit has a wonderful local rule which prevents the type of conduct of which I complain here. The rule states as follows:

“Coordination of Hearing Date. It is the responsibility of counsel preparing the notice of hearing to make a good faith effort to coordinate with the court and all opposing counsel to set the hearing at a time that is mutually convenient. The filing of the notice of hearing shall constitute a certification of compliance with this rule.” 5th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. IV(A)(6) (eff. November 3, 1997).

The Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois has a similar rule that also applies to notices of depositions. 10th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 3.5 (adopted March 17, 2003). However, even in the absence of such a formal rule, exercising the courtesy required by that rule would not only avoid needless waste of resources and promote a more collegial relationship between opposing counsel, but it would undoubtedly also reduce the amount of antacids and blood pressure medication consumed by trial lawyers.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.