The opinion
DONIELSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with plaintiff’s argument that the county attorney’s office was obligated by the terms of section 336.2(6), The Code, to represent him in the contest court and any derivative proceedings but that office was under a disability because of its relationship with the presiding officer of the contest court.
Section 336.2(6) provides:
[It shall be the duty of the county attorney to:] (c) commence, prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings in which any county officer, in his official capacity, or the county, is interested, or a party.
In my opinion the election contest was clearly initiated against plaintiff in his “official capacity” after he was certified and declared an incumbent pursuant to section 57.3, The Code 1971, and is a suit in which he “is interested, or a party.” The language of section 336.2(6) should be “liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice.” Section 4.2, The Code. It is obvious the purpose of section 336.2(6) was not to require county officers to pay for their own legal defense in suits which arise solely *907 out of their status as a county official. Furthermore, in my opinion the majority’s decision will discourage qualified persons from seeking and holding public office if they are required to personally pay attorney fees in the event their election is contested. Therefore, I believe plaintiff should be entitled to reimbursement for the costs he incurred privately defending the election contest due to the county attorney’s disability.
I would reverse the trial court and remand for a hearing to determine a reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded to plaintiff.
OXBERGER, C. J., joins this dissent.