observing that silence in a statute “may itself be an ambiguity and, where appropriate, does, and should, trigger the liberal interpretation rule applicable to remedial statutes”
How later courts described this case
- observing that silence in a statute “may itself be an ambiguity and, where appropriate, does, and should, trigger the liberal interpretation rule applicable to remedial statutes”
- holding that an undocumented alien is a covered employee under the Act even though the statutory scheme makes no reference to an undocumented alien being a covered employee
- preemption would enable unscrupulous employers to engage in unsafe practices, leaving the cost of caring for injured workers to society
- “[A] provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, a remedial statute, it is subject to the rule [of liberal construction]. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant, and thus interpretation of its provisions may depend upon whether its terms are clear or ambiguous.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HARRELL, Judge,
dissenting.
The Majority opinion, after construing the language and legislative history of § 9-202 of the Labor and Employment Article, holds that appellee’s undocumented worker status is no bar to his receipt of workers’ compensation benefits under the Act. Maj. op. at 730, 882 A.2d at 824. I reach the opposite conclusion.
Section 9-202 of the Labor and Employment Article, the key statutory provision at issue here, provides that the definition of a “covered employee” is:
(a) In general. — Except as otherwise provided, an individual, including a minor, is a covered employee while in the service of an employer under an express or implied contract of apprenticeship or hire.
(b) Unlawful employment — Minors.—A minor may be a covered employee under this section even if the minor is employed unlawfully.
*741 Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), Labor and Employment Article, § 9-202. 1
The Majority opinion appropriately recites the primary canon of statutory construction: the Court will ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature. Maj. op. at 728, 882 A.2d at 823. In doing so, the Court will “read the statute so that ‘no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless.’ ” Maj. op. at 728, 882 A.2d at 823 (citations omitted). If the statute’s words are plain and unambiguous, then the Court “will give effect to the statute as the language is written” and will refrain from adding or deleting language to “ ‘reflect an intent not evidenced in that language.’ ” Maj. op. at 729, 882 A.2d at 823 (citations omitted).
Yet, the Majority neglects to abide by these statutory construction principles in application to the present case. The Majority opinion declares that § 9-202 “plainly and simply states that, ‘[ejxcept as otherwise provided,’ a ‘covered employee’ is characterized by two elements: [1] he or she, pursuant to ‘an express or implied contract of apprenticeship or hire’ [2] is ‘in the service of an employer.’ ” Maj. op. at 730, 882 A.2d at 824 (citations omitted). That summation, however, describes only the content of sub-section (a) of the statute. Section 9-202 is made up of two sub-sections. The Majority opinion ignores the second sub-section in its analysis. Doing so renders sub-section (b) superfluous and nugatory.
Section 9-202(b) provides that minors are covered employees even if unlawfully employed. Although neither § 9-202(a) nor (b) expressly states that an adult, in order to be considered a covered employee, is subject to a lawful employment requirement, it is implied not only by the language and structural position of § 9-202(b), but also by its mere existence. The Majority’s construction, in effect, revises the plain language of § 9-202(b), as well as the structure of § 9-202, to state that both minors and adults may be covered employees *742 even if employed unlawfully. By ignoring § 9-202(b), the Majority creates an interpretation reflecting an intent not evidenced by the Legislature’s chosen language, construing it with a forced interpretation that hyper-extends its plain meaning. The plain meaning of the language of the full statute prevents me from joining the Majority opinion.
Furthermore, the Majority’s use of legislative history here is inconsistent with established principles of statutory construction normally applied by the Court. After finding the statute to be unambiguous, the Majority reflects upon the legislative history of § 9-202 as part of a claimed “confirmatory process.” Maj. op. at 730, 882 A.2d at 824 (citations omitted). Here it appears that the Majority is using legislative history to justify its tacit disregard of § 9-202(b).
We have quite recently and frequently abided by the canon that:
[i]f there is no ambiguity in [the statute’s] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for “the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.”
Kushell, IV v. Dept. of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 577 , 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005) (quoting Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502 , 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004)); see also Smack v. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 304-05 , 835 A.2d 1175, 1178-79 (2003); Maryland Div. of Labor and Industry v. Triangle Gen. Contractors, 366 Md. 407, 421-22 , 784 A.2d 534, 542 (2001); Chesapeake Amusements Inc. v. Riddle, 363 Md. 16, 28 , 766 A.2d 1036, 1042 (2001); Abramson v. Montgomery County, 328 Md. 721, 736-37 , 616 A.2d 894, 901-02 (1992).
For instance, in Triangle General Contractors, the Court interpreted the meaning of a provision of the Maryland Prevailing Wage Act, after recodification, finding its language to be clear and unambiguous and affecting a substantive change in the statute as it existed before recodification. Triangle *743 Gen. Contractors, 366 Md. at 422 , 784 A.2d at 542 . Though we considered the Revisor’s Note to the recodification, which stated that no substantive change from the former version of the provision was intended, we were not blinded to the plain meaning of the current version of the statute, refusing to “express an intention which [was] not evidenced in the original form.” Id. (quoting Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 93 , 75 A.2d 343, 345 (1950)).
The Majority certainly would have been justified in reviewing the legislative history of the predecessor to § 9-202 (Md. Code, Art. 101, § 21(b)(1)), including the Revisor’s Notes to the recodification and the Report of the Department of Legislative Reference on House Bill (H.B.) 1-1991, had it found § 9-202 to be ambiguous. 2 , 3 Only upon the occasion that the statute’s plain meaning is uncertain would the presumption arise that a recodified version does not affect a substantive change unless the Legislature’s intent to modify the law was unmistakable. 4 Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. at 422-23 , 784 A.2d at 543 .
In addition to the Revisor’s Notes and the Report of the Department of Legislative Reference on H.B. 1 cited in the Majority opinion, it should be noted that the recodification was not merely a renumbering or a series of stylistic changes to *744 the prior relevant law. Chapter 8 of the Acts of 1991 (enacted H.B. 1-1991); see also Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. at 422 , 784 A.2d at 543 (discussing the Maryland Prevailing Wage Act recodification process). Yet, the Legislature unanimously enacted, relatively early in the 1991 session (21 March 1991) and without amendment, the 845-page H.B. 1 that became the Labor and Employment Article. The Legislature turned to the subject of the Workers’ Compensation Act an additional five times during the 1991 session (enacted after H.B. 1 was passed), enacting both substantive and stylistic changes to various sections, though not to § 9-202 (all of these bills addressed other sections of the new Labor and Employment Article). See Chapters 21, 440, 510, 575, 669 of the Acts of 1991. That these other bills made no further changes or corrections to § 9-202 as enacted in H.B. 1, suggests that the Legislature at least acquiesced in the changes, even the substantive ones, made by H.B. 1 in reenacting the Workers’ Compensation Act as part of the Labor and Employment Article, the Revisor’s Note notwithstanding.
Perhaps the Majority rationalizes its interpretation of the statute because it believes that H.B. 1 mistakenly failed to include “adults” in § 9-202(b) when it re-structured former Md. Code, Art. 101, § 21(b)(1). The predecessor to § 9-202, § 21(b)(1), provided that “[ejvery person, including a person under eighteen years of age, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed ...” was a covered employee. The clause “whether lawfully or unlawfully employed” in § 21(b)(1) most likely modified “every person”- — adults and minors, although there is room for grammatical debate on that score. The Code Revision Commission that drafted H.B. 1-1991 may have misunderstood in the reconstruction process the grammatical sense of the sentence in the predecessor statute and revised the section into two parts; be that as it may, there is no doubt in my mind that the clause “whether lawfully or unlawfully employed” in § 9-202(b) now modifies only minors. Whether the Legislature and its advisors/staff in 1991 blundered into the current structure of § 9-202, the Majority’s argument that the Legislature intended no substantive changes to the law in *745 its adoption of H.B. 1-1991 is hindered because the Legislature had ample opportunity to correct the mistake (if a mistake it was) later in the same session as well as over the years since.
Despite the potential for a drafting error, we should not deign to repair the presumed damage. The Court, though charged with the duty to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature, is not obliged to fix the Legislature’s error, if there is one here, especially when a statute otherwise appears clearly written on its face. A better policy, and one usually followed by this Court, is to employ a more disciplined approach and apply the plain meaning rule of statutory construction in such instances. See Kuskell, IV, 385 Md. at 577 , 870 A.2d at 193-94 ; Smack, 378 Md. at 304-05 , 835 A.2d at 1178-79 ; Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. at 421-22 , 784 A.2d at 542 ; Chesapeake Amusements, 363 Md. at 28 , 766 A.2d at 1042 ; Abramson, 328 Md. at 736-37 , 616 A.2d at 901-02 .
Thus, even had the Majority found § 9-202 to be ambiguous (which perhaps it did — see supra note 2) and concluded from its legislative history that the Legislature intended to provide that both minors and adults were not subject to a lawful employment requirement, the Court is not in a legitimate position to revise the statute by judicial fiat. To do so is inconsistent with our more modern cases and extends the Court’s reach beyond limits presumably we would respect in a case with less compelling social and policy implications. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
. Unless otherwise provided, all statutory references are to sections wilhin Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act, codified at Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.) t.abor and Employment Article, § 9-202.
. Although the Majority opinion states that the statute is "not ambiguous," it later states that the statute’s silence about whether lawful employment is a requirement for adults creates an ambiguity in the statute. Maj. op. at 729 n. 7.
. Section 9-202 may be ambiguous, but not for the reason set forth in footnote 7 of the Majority opinion. Either there is no lawful employment requirement for adults because none is expressly provided in subsection (a), as the Majority opines, or there is a lawful employment requirement for adults, as I believe the plain meaning reveals. That great minds disagree as to the section's meaning might create an ambiguity that necessitates a look at the legislative history to ascertain the Legislature's true intent. The evidence found in the legislative history of § 9-202 is nonetheless inconsistent.
. A presumption that the Court overcame in both Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. at 422 , 784 A.2d at 542 , and Abramson, 328 Md. at 736-37 , 616 A.2d at 901-02 .