holding that state legislation authorizing wiretapping and electronic surveillance “may adopt standards more stringent than the requirements of Federal law, thus excluding from state courts evidence which would be admissible in Federal courts, [but] may not adopt standards that are less restrictive . . .”
How later courts described this case
- holding that state legislation authorizing wiretapping and electronic surveillance “may adopt standards more stringent than the requirements of Federal law, thus excluding from state courts evidence which would be admissible in Federal courts, [but] may not adopt standards that are less restrictive . . .”
- declining to require ‘“specific search protocols or minimization undertakings as basic predicates for upholding digital search warrants”
- noting that it is necessary to restrict wiretapping “to ensure that unjustified and overly broad intrusions on rights of privacy are avoided” (emphasis added)
- both statutes “designed to ensure that unjustified and overly broad intrusions on rights of privacy are avoided;” that is, to protect Fourth Amendment rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Raytheon Co. v. Tully, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 620 (1994)
Vitello, however, is inapposite.
The opinion
Kaplan, J.
(dissenting). I refer to my separate opinion in Commonwealth v. Lykus, ante, 191 (1975). In the present cases, a ruling that it was error to receive the evidence based on the voice spectrograms would appear to entail reversal of the judgments.