holding that “where two or more persons acting independently are guilty of consecutive acts of negligence closely related in point of time, and cause damage to another under circumstances where the damage is indivisible ... the negligent actors are jointly and severally liable”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “where two or more persons acting independently are guilty of consecutive acts of negligence closely related in point of time, and cause damage to another under circumstances where the damage is indivisible ... the negligent actors are jointly and severally liable”
- “Where the precise cause of the injury clearly appears the [res ipsa loquitur ] rule is inapplicable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Thompson, J.
(concurring specially) — I concur in the majority opinion. I concur in Division III, however, only because the question of res ipsa loquitur there discussed has been decided by us in Harvey v. Borg, 218 Iowa 1228 , 257 N.W. 190 . I have serious doubts as to the soundness of the rule in the cited case, but agree the majority decision is correct unless Harvey v. Borg is to be overruled.
*1278 We pointed out in Shinofield v. Curtis, 245 Iowa 1352, 1360, 1361 , 66 N.W.2d 465, 470 , 50 A. L. R.2d 964, that the “Existence of circumstantial evidence of negligence in a particular case does not mean the res ipsa doctrine is applicable in that case”;.also that it depends upon the common experience of men “and not at 'all on evidence in the particular case that tends * * * to show such occurrence was in fact the result of negligence.”
In the instant ease there is ample evidence the collision was caused by failure to keep a proper lookout, or violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule, or perhaps lack of control. I am unable to believe the “common experience of men” tells us a rear-end collision does not occur without some negligence of the driver of the rear vehicle. It might as well be caused by the front ear stopping too suddenly, without a signal or other warning. True, there was evidence here that plaintiff’s car had been stopped for some time before it was struck; but this merely supports evidence of specific negligences of the defendant.' It was circumstantial evidence of negligence.
Only the rule of stare decisis impels me to concur in Division III above referred to.