holding an appeal to be untimely and unreviewable where the plaintiff filed both a motion to reconsider and a motion to amend her complaint, but where she waited until the denial of her motion to amend, which was subsequent both to the denial of her motion to reconsider and the passing of 30 days from the judgment
How later courts described this case
- holding an appeal to be untimely and unreviewable where the plaintiff filed both a motion to reconsider and a motion to amend her complaint, but where she waited until the denial of her motion to amend, which was subsequent both to the denial of her motion to reconsider and the passing of 30 days from the judgment
- holding that the appellate court's original July 1, 1999, decision was not final because the defendants had filed petitions for rehearing
- ruling that only a timely notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court
- noting that when a petition for rehearing is filed, the judgment of the reviewing court does not become final until the petition is denied
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by LaGrange Memorial Hosp. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 863 (2000)
We conclude that Berg is inapposite as it did not involve either Supreme Court Rule 303(d) or a docketing error on the part of counsel, similar to that in Herrin and the instant case.
The opinion
JUSTICE McMORROW, also dissenting:
Although I disagree with Justice Freeman’s position on the jurisdictional issue in this case, I agree with the remainder of his special concurrence. In particular, I join in his remarks about the rehearing process, the citation of supervisory orders as authority, and the appropriate tone for opinions issued by this court. These matters prevent me from joining Chief Justice Harrison’s dissent. I have chosen to file my own dissenting opinion to explain my view that, under the unique facts of this case, the appellate court’s exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate.
The majority concludes that plaintiffs notice of appeal was not timely under this court’s decisions in Fultz and Andersen that a motion for leave to amend is not a valid post-judgment motion under Rule 303. These cases, however, are factually distinguishable from plaintiffs. In Fultz and Andersen, the plaintiffs filed motions for leave to amend following the dismissals of their complaints. This court held that those motions were not “directed against the judgment” because they did not request modification or vacation of the circuit court’s judgment. Thus, they were not valid post-judgment motions for purposes of Rulé 303(a). By contrast, plaintiffs request for leave to amend was part of a valid post-judgment motion, which asked for reconsideration of the circuit court’s summary judgment ruling. See 735 ILCS 5/2— 1203 (West 1998); Andersen, 133 Ill. 2d at 347.
Unlike the majority, I believe this distinction is significant. Rule 303(a) provides that the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal begins to run upon the entry of an order “disposing” of the last “post-judgment motion.” Given that plaintiff’s post-judgment motion included a request for leave to amend in addition to a request for reconsideration, it was not unreasonable for her to believe that her “motion” was not “disposed” of until the court had ruled on both issues.
Justice Freeman asserts that a holding in this case that plaintiffs notice of appeal was timely would permit nonprevailing litigants to prolong the 30-day period under Rule 303 by filing motions for leave to amend in addition to their other post-judgment motions. I disagree that this would be the result of finding that jurisdiction existed under the particular facts of this case.
Because of differences in the motion filed by plaintiff and the motions at issue in Fultz and Andersen, holding that plaintiff’s motion was timely would not alter the Fultz-Andersen rule that a motion requesting only leave to amend does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Moreover, it is important to note that, in this case, the circuit court separated plaintiffs request for leave to amend from the remainder of plaintiffs post-judgment motion and chose to decide it at a later time. A circuit court faced with a similar motion in the future could dispose of all portions of the motion at the same time, thereby preventing a request for leave to amend from prolonging the appellate process.
Under the circumstances of this case, the timing of plaintiffs notice of appeal was proper under a reasonable interpretation of Rule 303. In my view, it would be unfair to deny plaintiff access to the appellate court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.