the failure to call a witness will not support an ineffectiveness claim unless it is unreasonable for counsel to believe that the anticipated testimony would be harmful or have no probative value for guilt or innocence
How later courts described this case
- the failure to call a witness will not support an ineffectiveness claim unless it is unreasonable for counsel to believe that the anticipated testimony would be harmful or have no probative value for guilt or innocence
- in the absence of any promise of leniency, the statement at most showed a desire to be released from custody; admission of prior consistent statements was harmless error and did not warrant reversal
- trial counsel’s decision to call a particular witness is a matter of trial strategy where the individual’s testimony would likely have harmed the defendant
- death sentence not unreasonably disparate where defendant shot all or almost all of the victims, despite accomplice’s more serious criminal background
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE SIMON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the portion of the majority opinion that affirms the defendant’s conviction. I believe, however, that the defendant’s waiver of his right to be sentenced by a jury was not knowingly and intelligently made, and I therefore dissent from the affirmance of the death sentence. The defendant was not told prior to waiving a jury for sentencing that a jury’s decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. As I have stated before (People v. Hall (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 376, 422 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 296 (Simon, J., specially concurring)), fundamental fairness requires that trial judges correctly inform all capital defendants of the unanimity requirement before accepting jury waivers at death sentencing hearings.
This court has previously taken the position that it is the responsibility of the defendant’s attorney to be certain that the defendant understood the rule and that his waiver was knowing and intelligent. (People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 111, 142 .) This case, however, illustrates the problem with that approach because there is no evidence in the record that the defendant’s attorney explained the unanimity requirement to him. I would require a trial judge to inform a defendant that if he chooses to have his sentence determined by a jury, the death penalty can be imposed only if all 12 jurors agree that it should be and that if even one juror disagrees, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
I also dissent from the imposition of the death sentence for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 179 (Simon, J., dissenting), based on my belief that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional and that the death sentence in this case should be vacated. See also People v. Johnson (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 119, 152-53 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and authorities cited therein.