The opinion
BYER, Judge,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize the very narrow scope of review in this case which results from employer’s having filed a petition for rehearing rather than an immediate appeal to this court.
As noted in the majority opinion, employer did not appeal the September 7, 1989 decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board. Instead, employer filed a petition for rehearing on October 11, 1989. Curiously, this was two days after expiration of the thirty-day appeal period under *212 Pa.R.A.P. 1512(a)(1) 1 but well within the eighteen-month period for filing a rehearing petition under section 426 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 871.
There is nothing in the briefs or in the record explaining why employer filed a petition for rehearing before the board rather than a petition for review appealing directly to this court from the September 7, 1989 decision. I cannot discern any valid basis for such a deliberate procedural choice by employer. That deliberate procedural choice has profound consequences for our subsequent appellate review.
On direct appeal from a decision of the board, we may review the decision for legal error or to determine if findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 2 Although this standard of review might, on occasion, be described as narrow, it is much broader than our scope of review of a decision by the board to deny a petition for rehearing.
As emphasized in the majority opinion, the decision of the board to grant or deny a rehearing is highly discretionary. Notwithstanding the fact that the board is not limited by the same stringent standards as govern a motion for new trial based upon after-discovered evidence in a civil action, 3 it nevertheless would be a relatively rare case where the board’s denial of a rehearing would be reversible error.
The important point for practitioners to recognize is that a petition for rehearing under section 426 of the act, 77 P.S. § 871, is not the functional equivalent of a motion for post-trial relief in a civil action under Pa.R.C.P. 227.1. The filing of a petition for rehearing is not a procedural condition precedent to the filing of a direct appeal to this court. As noted in the majority opinion, even where a petition for *213 rehearing is filed within thirty days of the board’s decision, it does not toll the thirty-day appeal period. 4
Because of the great impact on our standard of review, parties would be well-advised not to file a petition for rehearing before the board in lieu of a direct appeal to this court. In a situation where a party believes it has grounds for a rehearing, such as the discovery of previously unavailable evidence within thirty days of the original order, it would be advisable nevertheless for that party to file both the petition for rehearing as well as an appeal within thirty days of the original decision. By filing both, the right to direct appeal is preserved even if the board ultimately denies rehearing. If the board grants rehearing within thirty days of the original order, then it renders the appeal “inoperative” and the time for appeal begins to run anew once the board enters its final decision on rehearing. Pa.R. A.P. 1701(b)(3). 5
I do not suggest that the result in this case would have been different if employer had appealed the original decision. I merely emphasize the procedural posture of this case in the hope it will help practitioners avoid this procedural trap in cases where it might affect the outcome.
. The thirtieth day, October 7, 1989, was a Saturday, so the last day for appeal would have been the following Monday, October 9, 1989. Pa.R.A.P. 107; 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
. See Cudo v. Hallstead, 517 Pa. 553 , 539 A.2d 792 (1988).
. The time for appeal would be tolled only where the board expressly grants a reconsideration or rehearing within the original thirty-day period. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3).
. The act is somewhat unique, in that it permits the board to grant a rehearing up to eighteen months after the issuance of its final decision. 77 P.S. § 871. If the board grants the rehearing more than 30 days after the original decision but while an appeal is pending in our court, our practice is to remand the appeal to the board.