The opinion
Christianson, J.
(concurring). This controversy involves the application or construction of NDRC 1943, 65-0428 as amended by Laws 1949, Chapter 354, a section of the Workmen’s Compensation Law of this state, which reads as follows:
“Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for injury to or death of any employee, wherever occurring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into the' fund.”
The above section was embodied in the original act (Laws 1919, Ch.162, Sec 9), although as pointed out in the opinion prepared by Judge Crimson a provision in the original act that this section should not be applicable to minors employed in violation of law was eliminated by the amendment made by Ch 354, Laws 1949.
The Workmen’s Compensation Law was first enacted in this state as Chapter 162, Laws 1919. It was entitled:
*491 . “An Act Creating the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Fund, for the Benefit of Employees Injured and the Dependents of Employees Killed in Hazardous Employment; Fixing the Duties and Liabilities of Employees and Employers; Creating the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau and prescribing its Powers and Duties; Providing for Expenditures Hereunder and Limiting the Amount Thereof; and Making an Appropriation Therefor.”
The Act provided that whenever used in the Act:
“ ‘Hazardous employment’ means any employment in which one or more employees are regularly employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, except agriculture and domestic service, and any common carrier by steam railroad.
“ ‘Employee’ means every person engaged in a hazardous employment under any appointment or contract of hire, or apprenticeship express dr implied, oral or written, including aliens, and also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, but excluding any person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.” Laws 1919, Ch 162, Sec 2; NDRC 1943, 65-0102(4-5).
“It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to employ anyone, or to receive the fruits of . the labor of any person, in a hazardous employment as defined in this chapter, when such employee is not protected by workmen’s compensation insurance in full force and effect. The bureau, by proper application to the courts of this state, may enjoin the unlawful employment of uninsured workers.” NDRC 1943, 65-0105.
“An employer securing the payment of compensation by contributing premiums to' the Workmen’s Compensation Fund shall thereby be relieved from all liability for personal injuries or death sustained by his employees and the persons entitled, to compensation under this Act shall have recourse therefor only to the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Fund and not to the employer.” Laws 1919, Ch 162, Sec 6; NDRC 1943, 65-0108.
While certain changes have been made in the Workmen’s Com *492 pensation Act the above provisions were contained in the original act and have been retained without substantial change.
The Workmen’s Compensation Law in force at all times involved in this controversy provided:
“ ‘Injury’ shall mean only an injury arising in the course of employment including an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his-employment, but such term shall not include an injury caused by the employee’s willful intention to injure himself or to injure another, nor any injury caused by the voluntary intoxication of the employee. Such term, in .addition to an injury by accident, shall include:
a. Any disease which can be fairly traceable to the employment.” NDRC 1943, 65-0102(8).
“Where one performs service for another for a remuneration, whether the same is paid as a salary, commission, or otherwise, the person performing such service is presumed to be an employee of the person for whom the services are performed until the contrary is shown.” NDRC 1943, 65-0103.
The law further provides that an employer who is subject to the provisions of the act and who fails to comply with the provisions thereof so as to secure the payment of compensation to his employees by contributing the prescribed premiums shall not be entitled to the benefits of the law during the period of noncompliance, “but shall be liable to his employees for damages suffered by reason of injuries sustained in the course of employment, and also shall be liable to the personal representatives of such employees where death results from such injuries. The employer shall not avail himself in such action of the following common law defenses: 1. The defense of the fellow-servant rule; 2. The defense of the assumption of risk; or 3. The defense of contributory negligence. The employer shall be liable for the premiums provided for in this title.” NDRC 1943, 65-0901. And that any employee whose employer has failed to comply with the provisions of the law so as to secure payment of compensation to the employee under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, who shall be injured in the course of his employment, in lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action may file *493 an application with the Bnrean for an award of compensation; that the Bureau shall hear and determine such application for compensation in like manner as in any other claims before the Bureau; that, the Bureau may make an award and that if the employer fails to pay the award then judgment may be entered thereon in the district court for the amount of the award and that upon such final judgment being rendered against the employer the employee shall be entitled to compensation for such injury to be paid from the general fund of the Bureau. NDRC 1943, 65-0904.
In construing Workmen’s Compensation Acts it has been held by the courts generally that in the absence of controlling statutes to the contrary an injured person or his dependents are entitled to compensation only if he is an employee, workman or servant of his employer at the time of the accident or injury. 71 CJ 420. See, also, 58 Am Jur Workmen’s Compensation, p 665. And the holdings of this Court are to the same effect. As said in the opinion prepared by Judge Grimson:
“This Court has repeatedly held that the relationship of employer and employee must exist in order to make the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act applicable. See Kronick v. McLean County, 52 ND 852 , 204 NW 839 ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 71 ND 78 , 298 NW 773 ; Groff v. State, 72 ND 554 , 9 NW2d 406 ; Starkenberg v. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 73 ND 234 , 13 NW2d 395 .”
In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, supra, this Court said: “The relationship of employer and employee must exist in order to make the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act . . . applicable.” In Starkenberg v. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, supra, this Court said:
“The relation of employer and employee must exist in order to render the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Fund liable for compensation benefits. The Fund is not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor.”
I agree that Sec 65-0428, supra, applies only in cases between an employer and his employee, and that the words “any employee” in such section have reference only to a person who sustains the relationship of an employee to the person or con *494 cera, claimed to be the employer. Indeed, I do not see how any other meaning can be attributed to it without ignoring the plain purpose and design of the statute and giving to the words “any employee” a meaning and intent inharmonious with the design and purpose of the act as evidenced by the statute considered as a whole. The legislative intention and purpose is to be determined from general consideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular topic to which the language in question is found. 59 CJ 993; Crawford Statutory Construction p 261.
“The act must be interpreted as a whole, and not by talcing single words here and there to determine its true meaning.” In Re Milwaukee Chapter; Izaak Walton League of America, et al, 194 Wis 437, 440-441, 216 NW 493, 495 .
“In construing statute, court will not take detached sentences or sections, but take statute by its four corners, the better to ascertain intent of 'the lawmakers.” (Syllabus, par 6) State v. Lee Chue, 130 Ore 99, 100, 279 Pac 285 .
American Jurisprudence says:
“A statute is not open to construction as a matter of course. It is open to construction only where the language used in the statute requires interpretation, that is, where the statute is ambiguous, or will bear two or more constructions, or is of such doubtful or obscure meaning, that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. In the case of such unambiguity, it is the established policy of the courts to regard the statute as meaning what it says, and to avoid giving it any other construction than that which its words demand. The plain and obvious meaning of the language used is not only the safest guide to follow in construing it, but it has been presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute expresses the legislative intention, so that such plain and obvious provisions must control. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for *495 itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity.” 50 Am Jur pp 204-207.
It seems to me that when the' Workmen’s Compensation Law is considered as a whole the meaning of the words “any employee” in Sec 65-0428, supra, is so apparent that there can be no question as to their meaning in the enactment.
I agree that the statute as so construed and applied is in no sense violative of Sec 20 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota or Art 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
I concur in an affirmance of the judgment.
I concur in the foregoing opinion by Judge Christianson.
Sathre, J.