applying arbitrary and capricious standard of review because "board is free to use its judgment in determining when and to whom to grant exemptions from its regulations" in exercise of its administrative discretion
How later courts described this case
- applying arbitrary and capricious standard of review because "board is free to use its judgment in determining when and to whom to grant exemptions from its regulations" in exercise of its administrative discretion
- decisions to grant exemptions from curriculum regulations were entirely within the board’s administrative discretion, and certiorari review was therefore limited to a determination whether the board acted arbitrarily and capriciously
- where agency “is free to use its judgment in determining when and to whom to grant exemptions from its regulations,” arbitrary or capricious test will be applied in certiorari action
- judge correctly applied “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review where proceeding before board was not adjudicatory and did not implicate right to engage in lawful occupation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Nolan, J.
(dissenting, with whom Liacos and Lynch, JJ., join). The court decides today that G. L. c. 30A does not apply to the board’s actions. I disagree. While only an “adjudicatory proceeding” triggers requirements of c. 30A, the statute defines an adjudicatory proceeding as one “before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing” (emphasis added). G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (1) (1986 ed.). Since G. L. c. 112, § 51, by itself confers no right to a hearing, “[i]t thus must be decided whether, in any event, ‘an opportunity for an agency hearing’ upon such an application is ‘required by constitutional right’ within the meaning of c. 30A, § 1 (1).” Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 495 (1965).
*220 This court recognized in both Milligan, supra, and Marmer v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors, 358 Mass. 13, 16-17 (1970), that administrative decisions affecting lawful occupations directly touch individuals’ economic and property rights as well as personal rights. Here, the board’s actions not only bear on the right to practice an occupation by impeding the ability to train, but also affect Forsyth’s economic interests in maintaining a nationally competitive program. Accordingly, “fundamental considerations of fairness require such decisions ... to be made objectively, under reasonable procedures, and with appropriate opportunity for judicial review.” Milligan, supra. 1
General Laws c. 30A, § 11, sets forth requirements for adjudicatory hearings. The record reflects that the board ignored many of these requirements during the hearing on Forsyth’s petition. No testimony was recorded, no opportunity to respond to adverse witnesses was provided, and no written statement of reasons was given at the time the board denied Forsyth’s petition.
Because it is apparent that Forsyth was entitled to, but was denied, the protection afforded by c. 30A, I believe the case should be remanded to the board for a hearing in compliance with G. L. c. 30A, § 11. Accordingly, I dissent.
I believe that Forsyth has standing to assert these claims. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976), the United States Supreme Court determined that a party has standing “to assert those concomitant rights of third parties that would be ‘diluted or adversely affected’ should . . . [the] constitutional challenge fail.”