holding evictions may only be executed by appropriate legal process, and not by landlord self- help
How later courts described this case
- holding evictions may only be executed by appropriate legal process, and not by landlord self- help
- where this court overruled prior decision and held that a tenant may bring civil action against landlord for wrongful eviction, court also held that its decision applied retroactively to parties in the litigation but not to evictions involving others that occurred before the date of decision
- holding evictions may only be executed by appropriate legal process not landlord self-help
- “[I]n this jurisdiction, the landlord’s common law right of self-help has been abrogated, and the legislatively created remedies for reacquiring possession are exclusive.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991)
Mendes was implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), and
Abrogated in part by Davis v. Moore, 2001 D.C. App. LEXIS 104 (2001)
389 A.2d 781, 787 (D.C. 1978) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds by Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 230
Distinguished
Distinguished by Simpson v. Lee, 1985 D.C. App. LEXIS 521 (1985)
Mendes v. Johnson, supra, 389 A.2d 781, that a landlord does not have the right to self-help, is inapplicable to commercial property which has been abandoned by the tenant.
The opinion
GALLAGHER, Associate Judge,
with whom NEBEKER, Associate Judge, joins in part, and with whom YEAGLEY, Associate Judge, joins, concurring and dissenting:
I agree that in this day and age the use of self-help in this jurisdiction rather than resort to the court to evict a tenant should be relegated to the past.
I think, however, that this new rule of law should be given prospective effect. After all, until today the decision in Snitman v. Goodman, D.C.Mun.App., 118 A.2d 394 (1955), permitted self-help. It is the holding of today’s decision that Snitman v. Goodman is overruled.
I suppose one can rationalize various sorts of academic distinctions on prospective versus retroactive effect that may seem rather impressive but, for me, in the end it gets down to simple equity. Why should this court approve a penalty laid upon a litigant whose act was authorized by an extant decision of this court — a decision which must now be overruled in deciding this case? One might consider this court more nearly responsible than the litigant. In a case quite similar in principle we concluded the decision should be given prospective effect. Kelly Adjustment Co. v. Boyd, D.C.App., 342 A.2d 361 (1975).
It seems to me the court, in the end, should here look predominantly to whether it is equitable to penalize a defendant rather than to whether a plaintiff should be rewarded. That is certainly my concept of our jurisprudence in such circumstances and I would scarcely consider there is anything original about the viewpoint. All things considered, I favor prospective application. To this extent, I dissent.