holding that questioning prospective jurors about whether their “dealings or experiences with Negro persons … might make it difficult for [them] to sit in impartial judgment in this case?” was inadequate to uncover racial biases of potential jurors because the question was not “sufficiently probing or specific to reveal prejudices which might have immediate bearing on the present case.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that questioning prospective jurors about whether their “dealings or experiences with Negro persons … might make it difficult for [them] to sit in impartial judgment in this case?” was inadequate to uncover racial biases of potential jurors because the question was not “sufficiently probing or specific to reveal prejudices which might have immediate bearing on the present case.”
- racial difference between defendant and victim emphasized by Commonwealth’s trial strategy rendered case racially sensitive
- New trial granted where court rejected Appellant's proposed voir dire questions. Appellant made prompt objections and preserved the issue for appellate review, and circumstances indicated voir dire was inadequate to explore in sufficient depth the possible prejudices of prospective jurors
- a new trial was warranted in the prosecution of a black man for the rape of a white woman where the trial court prohibited the defendant from asking potential jurors questions regarding their opinions of interracial relationships and sexual inclinations of black men
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority concludes that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow appellant to ask prospective jurors the following questions:
“This case involves a rape-murder, the defendant in this case is black, do you feel that blacks have sexual drives that differ from whites?
Do you believe that there is anything wrong with a black man showing affection to a white woman?”
The trial court did allow appellant to ask:
“Have you had any dealings or experiences with Negro persons that might make it difficult to sit in impartial judgment on this case?”
I believe the trial court, in allowing appellant to ask this question, fulfilled its obligation to permit appellant to explore an area of potential juror prejudice relating to this trial. See Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422 , 366 A.2d 246 (1976) (no reversible error where trial court refused to allow accused to ask potential jurors whether race would affect their judgment concerning credibility, but did allow *146 the accused to ask whether race could impair judgment generally). Moreover, I believe the asking of the rejected questions would improperly tip the delicate balance which maintains an impartial trial atmosphere, and instead tend to create an impermissible cloud of prejudicial suggestions and implications.
A court need not approve every question a defendant desires to ask on voir dire, even if the Commonwealth, as here, does not object. To ensure a fair trial, the court has an independent obligation to determine the propriety of questions. Section 5.1 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge (Approved Draft, 1972), provides:
“Conduct of voir dire examination of jurors
The judge should initiate the voir dire examination by identifying the parties and their respective counsel and by referring to the charge against the accused, and by putting to the prospective jurors questions touching their qualifications, including impartiality, to serve as jurors in the case. The judge should also permit such additional questions by the defendant or his attorney and the prosecutor as he deems reasonable and proper.”
The Commentary to this Section points out:
“This standard is intended to preclude use of voir dire for such extraneous purposes as predisposing jurors favorably or unfavorably towards or against the defendant, the government, counsel, or anyone else. Nevertheless, in permitting use of voir dire to determine whether to challenge peremptorily, the standard is open to abuse unless the trial judge exercises careful control.”
Accord, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 2.4 (Approved Draft, 1968). The trial court can discharge this responsibility fairly and effectively only if it considers all relevant facts, including courtroom atmosphere, the nature of the offense, potential composition of the jury, and characteristics of the accused. *147 Recognizing the “superiority of his nether position” and because “he sees more and senses more,” M. Rosenberg, “Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above,” 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635, 663 (1971), quoted in Del Piano v. United States, 575 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1978), our cases afford the trial court broad discretion in controlling voir dire. See e. g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130 , 305 A.2d 5 (1973).
The majority not only approves prejudicial questions, but also interferes with the trial court’s exercise of its sound discretion by failing to recognize that important, on-the-scene considerations may have shaped the trial court’s decision to limit appellant’s inquiry on voir dire. Recognizing and understanding the courtroom atmosphere surrounding this crime and the prejudicial impact of these additional questions, and having already allowed the accused to probe this area of prejudice without introducing extraneous considerations, the trial court could reasonably and properly conclude that nothing in the additional questions could promote a fair trial. *
Nothing in this record establishes, or even suggests, that appellant did not have a fair trial before an impartial and properly selected jury. In holding to the contrary, the majority engages in nothing more than speculation, substituting its own assessment of proposed questions for that of the trial court. Finding no error of law or abuse of discretion in the court’s rulings on proposed questions for voir dire, no merit in appellant’s allegations of trial error, and sufficient evidence to support a verdict of murder of the first degree, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
The majority’s attempted analogy to proposed points for charge underscores its failure to consider and respect the important factors which require a trial court to enjoy discretion on voir dire. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on points for charge, an appellate court is guided by legal principles as applied to facts of record to a far greater extent than in reviewing questions for voir dire, where courtroom considerations not always of record play a crucial role in guiding the court’s discretion.