stating that the purpose of this section of the Act is to deter public officers from participating in official decisions that would benefit them financially to the prejudice of those whom they serve
How later courts described this case
- stating that the purpose of this section of the Act is to deter public officers from participating in official decisions that would benefit them financially to the prejudice of those whom they serve
- “It is difficult to imagine that a tenant commissioner’s interest would be any different from any nontenant commissioner selected from the citizenry”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JONES, dissenting:
The majority has inexplicably chosen to ignore the concluding independent clause of the statutory sentence they have analyzed. That concluding clause provides, “* * * nor shall he have any interest, direct or indirect, in any contract or proposed contract for materials or services to be furnished or used in connection with any project.” (Emphasis added.) In my opinion this clause renders completely nugatory the reasoning of the majority and I respectfully dissent.
Tire court in Housing Authority v. Dorsey (1973), 164 Conn. 247 , 320 A.2d 820 , construed a provision identical to the statute considered by the majority and arrived at a contrary result. Understandably so since they considered the entire statute. I believe the reasoning in the Dorsey case was correct and that the result in this case should have been the same.
Disqualification for office because of conflicts of interest permeates our system of law and government and it would add nothing to attempt a compilation of tire areas of conflict here. Disqualification is specified for the fundamentally sound reason that conflicts of interest spawn biased decisions. I see the case for the two individuals who are the beneficiaries of the majority decision as being little, if any, different from that of a judge who presides in a trial in which he is personally interested in the outcome.