explaining that, in reviewing a sex crime conviction, “[i]f the testimony of the complaining witness is clear and convincing or is independently corroborated [citations], we will not set aside a finding of guilty unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to cause reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, in reviewing a sex crime conviction, “[i]f the testimony of the complaining witness is clear and convincing or is independently corroborated [citations], we will not set aside a finding of guilty unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to cause reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that a court need only explain that a unanimous vote is required before a jury can impose the death penalty
- allowing officer's testimony that he investigated an armed robbery and shooting and discovered that defendant had shot two women in his apartment
- Witherspoon error applies only to sentencing and does not affect conviction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting:
The jury which convicted the defendant was death-qualified, and a number of prospective jurors who stated that they could not impose the death penalty were excluded for cause. As explained in my dissenting opinion in People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 128, 170 , I believe that conviction by such a jury violates an accused’s right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. On this ground I would reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.
I also dissent from the imposition of the death sentence on the ground that defendant’s waiver of a jury at the sentencing hearing was not knowing and intelligent. A waiver cannot be knowing and intelligent if it is based on a mistaken understanding of the law. The explanation of the unanimity rule as it applies to a death penalty hearing that was given to the defendant by the trial court was an inaccurate statement of the law. The “common sense reading of the [court’s] admonition” (112 Ill. 2d at 141), contrary to what the majority asserts, is not that there must be unanimous agreement by the jury only to impose the death penalty, but that there must also be unanimous agreement not to impose the sentence. The interpretation adopted by the majority may be the “common sense reading” of the admonition by an attorney, but not by a defendant untrained in the law.
The majority takes the position that it was the responsibility of the defendant’s attorney to be certain that the defendant understood the rule and that his waiver was, as the attorney represented to the court it was, knowing and intelligent. Unlike the majority, I would require a trial judge to inform a defendant that if he opts for a jury trial at his sentencing hearing, the death penalty can be imposed only if all 12 jurors agree that it should be and, additionally, that if even one juror disagrees, the death penalty cannot be imposed. However, the majority’s argument does not even address the fact that the court itself gave an erroneous statement of the law to the defendant. Moreover, there is no way of knowing whether the defendant’s attorney gave him an accurate explanation, since no explanation by the attorney appears in the record. The ultimate question is whether the defendant understood the rule correctly when he waived a jury at his sentencing hearing, and the majority’s speculation as to whose explanation, counsel’s or the court’s, “had the greatest influence on the defendant’s decision” (112 Ill. 2d at 141) does not answer that question.
This court has thus far declined to adopt a rule that expressly requires a circuit court judge to inform a defendant of the unanimity requirement and its application to a death penalty hearing before accepting a jury waiver. However, when a judge does inform a defendant of the requirement, the explanation must be an accurate statement of the law, or the defendant’s subsequent waiver is, in my opinion, invalid because it may be based on a mistaken understanding of the law.
In addition, I believe that the death sentence imposed here was tainted by unreliable evidence allowed by the judge at the sentencing hearing. Although the court at a death sentence hearing may receive evidence of other criminal acts of the defendant, the judge “must ‘exercise care to insure the accuracy of information considered.’ ” (People v. LaPointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 496 , quoting People v. Adkins (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 297, 300 .) The majority, while continuing to pay lip service to this principle, has effectively pulled the teeth from the reliability standard.
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the State called a police officer to testify that he had investigated a reported armed robbery at the defendant’s apartment several years before and that he had learned that the defendant shot two women during the incident. The majority is satisfied with the reliability of this evidence because the officer “compiled the information during an official investigation” (112 Ill. 2d at 144), even though the charges arising from the incident were ultimately dismissed by the State. In holding that wholly uncorroborated testimony of this type is sufficiently reliable to be considered in a life or death sentencing determination, the majority silently recedes from the principles underlying our prior cases.
There is nothing especially reliable about information simply because it was developed in the course of a police investigation. This is not to disparage police efficiency; the officer conceded that he did not witness the shootings but “knew only what [he] was told.” He revealed neither the source of his information nor the basis of his belief that the defendant shot the two women. Since people may lie or give inaccurate information to the police, such evidence cannot be credited without some greater showing.
Indeed, the very purpose for the prophylactic hearsay rule at trial is to eliminate this type evidence, which is particularly likely to be unreliable because there is no way to test the sincerity, memory, or perception of the informant. While the hearsay rule is inapplicable in the second stage of a death sentencing hearing, this court has not permitted other-crimes testimony without some corroboration of the witness’ account.
Corroboration of such testimony can take various forms. For example, the judge is warranted in admitting other-crimes testimony at the sentencing phase when the defendant was actually convicted of the offenses described in the testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373 (testimony “strongly corroborated” by guilty pleas); People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 88 ; People v. Eddmonds (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 44 .) Even if there has been no conviction for the wrongdoing, other-crimes testimony may be considered reliable when the witness is testifying from “first-hand knowledge” of the events. (People v. Ramirez (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 439, 461 ; see also People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 88 ; People v. LaPointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482 ; People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378 .) In this situation, the defendant can confront the witness in order to test the reliability of the evidence.
A witness’ testimony may also be corroborated by the circumstances or by other reliable testimony. For instance, in People v. Perez (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 70, 87 , the court held that hearsay evidence that the defendant had indirectly threatened the life of the witness, a prison guard, “was reliable in that it was corroborated by [the guard’s] testimony concerning the direct threats against him” by the defendant and the fact that the prison authorities disciplined the defendant for the threats. Finally, in People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342 , the court found a police officer’s testimony that the defendant committed another killing reliable under the circumstances where the information came from the dying victim.
Nothing corroborative of the police officer’s testimony was present here. I do not understand how justice permits a sentence of death to stand when it may have been influenced by evidence of such questionable reliability. The court appears to be abandoning any attempt to give meaning to the reliability standard for admission of evidence at the sentencing hearing, and I fear that this will further the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty in this State.
Finally, for the reasons set forth in my separate opinions in People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 179 (Simon, J., dissenting), People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 147, 184 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 549 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I believe that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional and that the sentence of death imposed in this case must be vacated.