concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a psychiatrist who was the director of the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center was a public employee where there was evidence that no one directed his day to day activities, he alone made medical decisions in connection with treating his patients, and he set his own work schedule
How later courts described this case
- concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a psychiatrist who was the director of the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center was a public employee where there was evidence that no one directed his day to day activities, he alone made medical decisions in connection with treating his patients, and he set his own work schedule
- finding dispute of material fact as to whether yet another University of Massachusetts psychiatrist was a “public employee”
- disputed issues of fact presented as to whether physician was directed or controlled by anyone at public employer concerning day-to-day activities
- “In short, it is the State’s holding of a mental health patient against his or her will that gives rise to the constitutional right to adequate medical care.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’Connor, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom Wilkins and Greaney, JJ., join). In support of his motion for summary judgment on the negligence and wrongful death claims, the defendant submitted materials, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), which, had they been uncontradicted, would have shown that the defendant was an employee of the Commonwealth subject to the control of his superiors, and therefore immune from liability. Thus, under rule 56 (c), the burden shifted to the plaintiff to produce countervailing rule 56 (c) materials. Because the plaintiff did so, I agree with the court that the judge properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and wrongful death claims.
I do not agree, however, that “in light of the plaintiff’s admission before this court, summary judgment must be granted to the defendant on the § 1983 claim.” Ante at 399. As the court rightly says, ante at 402, “the judge was correct, on the record before him, to deny summary judgment” on that claim, and I would leave the matter right there. I would affirm the order denying summary judgment on all the plaintiff’s claims.
The court states that the plaintiff admitted at oral argument and in a letter that the decedent was “committed voluntarily to Fuller following a ten-day period of involuntary commitment.” Ante at 402-403. The court “assume[s] . . . *406 that the decedent’s status was ‘conditional voluntary.’ ” Ante at 403 n.8. Indeed, plaintiffs counsel’s postargument letter states that, after the period of involuntary commitment had expired by law, Brenda Sue Williams’s “status was subsequently changed to conditional voluntary and she became a lifetime resident of [Fuller]” (emphasis added). Title 104 Code Mass. Regs. 3.04 (2) (b) (1978), provides that “a patient on conditional voluntary admission status, or any parent or guardian who applied for the admission of such person, shall give three (3) days’ written notice to the superintendent or other head of the facility of his intention to leave such facility or to withdraw such person from the facility.” The superintendent then has a right to file a petition for commitment on notice that a patient wishes to leave. G. L. c. 123, § 11 (1990 ed.). Plaintiffs counsel’s “admission” falls far short of demonstrating that Brenda Sue Williams, who, as the court notes, ante at 399-400, “suffered from several physical and mental disabilities” and whose long-term residency at Fuller began with an involuntary commitment, was a “voluntary” patient, unrestrained by the State and therefore not constitutionally entitled to adequate medical care. Many critical factual questions remain unanswered. The court cites no case holding that, on the few facts “admitted” here, the plaintiff would be unable to establish a meritorious § 1983 claim at trial.
Were this court to affirm the judge’s denial of summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, as I would do, the defendant would not be precluded on remand from presenting another motion in the Superior Court, appropriately supported by reference to rule 56 (c) materials, and the plaintiffs right to present “countervailing materials” would be triggered. Only in this way can a proper determination be made concerning whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of proving at trial that the decedent had a due process right to adequate medical care.