holding that a sheriff is a county officer whose duties are meant to benefit the county at large and thus the county is liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the sheriffs negligence in the execution of his official duties
How later courts described this case
- holding that a sheriff is a county officer whose duties are meant to benefit the county at large and thus the county is liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the sheriffs negligence in the execution of his official duties
- plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages from county absent showing that the municipality “ratified, condoned, authorized, or approved” of acts of its employees
- insurance waives city’s § 2-102 immunity from punitive damages
- “the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer of the county”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD, specially concurring:
I concur in the result but disagree with some of the reasoning of Justice Lindberg’s decision. I do not think that the legislature in enacting section 9—103 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1—101 et seq.) intended to abolish the common law rule that a local government is not liable for punitive damages.
The common law rule is codified in section 2—102 of the Act, which states:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a local public entity is not liable to pay punitive or exemplary damages in any action brought directly against it by the injured party.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2—102.)
Justice Lindberg feels that this section is superseded by section 9—103, which has been interpreted to mean that a local public entity waives the defenses and immunities set forth in the Act when it purchases liability insurance. (See Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 173-74 .) Since section 2—102 is an immunity provided in the Act, the argument goes, it is waived.
But the cases so holding have dealt with other sections of articles II through VI of the Act, and not with the interaction of sections 2 — 102 and simply “A local public entity is not liable * * or “A public employee is not liable * * *” or “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable * * * ” None have the prefatory “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Justice Lindberg interprets this section to exclude the provisions of the Act itself. But I would give the language its plain meaning. Section 9—103 is a provision of law. Therefore, it is superseded by section 2—102. This interpretation is supported by the definition of law in section 1—205, which includes not only enactments but also case law. This comprehensive definition clearly indicates that the legislature intended a local government to remain immune from liability for punitive damages in all circumstances.
This interpretation is consistent with the long-established public policy that public entities are not liable for punitive damages. (See City of Chicago v. Langlass (1869), 52 Ill. 256, 259 ; George v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 692 .) George held that the CTA, a municipal corporation, is not liable for punitive damages. This immunity was based not upon the Tort Immunity Act, which the court held inapplicable, but upon the “long standing rule” that, in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing such recovery, the municipal corporations are not liable for punitive damages. It is illogical to grant immunity to those municipal corporations not covered by the Act but to deny it to those covered. And it is illogical to assume that the legislature intended to overturn this rule when it permitted municipal corporations to obtain liability insurance.
Finally, this interpretation imposes liability for punitive damages only when money will not come out of the pocket of the governmental unit. If the damages are greater than the policy limits, the unit does not have to pay the surplus. If the unit can no longer obtain liability coverage because of a large punitive damage award, the unit will never again be liable for punitive damages. It is true that this approach eliminates one of the traditional objections to punitive damages from local governmental entities: that they are an unjust burden on innocent taxpayers which do not directly punish the wrongdoers and have little deterrent effect. But it remains inconsistent with the purpose of imposing punitive damages. The purpose of such damages is to punish an offender and to deter others from similar unacceptable conduct. (Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31, 35 ; Prosser, Torts §2, at 9 (4th Ed. 1971).) Clearly this purpose is not furthered when the offender is not punished because his insurance company will pay the cost, nor is he deterred, for if he loses insurance protection he will be immune from the cost of his further misconduct. There is no reason to permit punitive damages against local governmental entities when insurance companies will bear the cost. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Village of Hempstead (1979), 48 N.Y.2d 218 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 , 397 N.E.2d 737 ; Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty (5th Cir. 1962), 307 F.2d 432 .
For the above reasons, I would hold that section 2 — 102 grants immunity to local public entities from liability for punitive damages regardless of whether they have purchased liability insurance.