holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendant’s prior consistent statement. Statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested, “clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendant’s prior consistent statement. Statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested, “clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen.”
- stating that the petitioner has the burden to prove his ineffectiveness allegations by submission of relevant evidence in support of the claim
- requiring that, to be admissible, a prior consistent statement must have been made before any corrupt motive has arisen
- requiring that, to be admissible, a prior statement must have been made before any corrupt motive has arisen
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The sole issue in this case is whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce on rebuttal a prior consistent statement given by appellee to the police at the time of his arrest. In my judgment, such an omission was clearly a material oversight on counsel’s part and justified the Superior Court’s determination that trial counsel was ineffective.
*489 The relevant facts are that appellee offered the alibi that he had just left his grandmother’s house where he had visited his mother who had been ill. Appellee’s mother and grandmother offered alibi testimony, after which appellee’s counsel sought to introduce a statement appellee had made to police to the same effect during appellee’s direct testimony. The trial judge properly denied appellee the right to admit his statement into evidence, and the Superior Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling in this regard. These rulings were indisputably correct, since appellee had not even been cross-examined at the point where his prior consistent statement was offered. The Commonwealth had presented no evidence that his claim of alibi had been recently fabricated.
The cross-examination of appellee focused on numerous inconsistencies in appellee’s alibi. Thereafter, appellee’s counsel did not seek or attempt to admit his prior consistent statement either on redirect or rebuttal. Before the PCHA court, appellee’s trial counsel testified that he was aware of the fact that the prior consistent statement was important and, having failed to get it in on direct testimony, simply overlooked its subsequent admission due to the pressure of the trial.
The majority argues that the Commonwealth did not expressly assert that the alibi was a recent fabrication. However, it has never been held that an explicit allegation of recent fabrication is to be made in order to allow admission of a prior consistent statement. This argument is not diminished by the fact that this statement was first made immediately after his arrest. What is significant is that, at all times, since these accusations had been leveled against him, his response had remained the same, and defense counsel had an obligation to stress that fact in answer to the Commonwealth’s attempt to suggest to the contrary.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.