stating that “the element of finality, which is the basis of appealability, is lacking in an order denying suppression and the defendant should have no right of appeal from such order.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the element of finality, which is the basis of appealability, is lacking in an order denying suppression and the defendant should have no right of appeal from such order.”
- stating that “[t]he mere fact that a non-appealable order rides on the coattails of an appealable order does not confer jurisdiction on this court to review the non-appealable order”
- quashing interlocutory cross- appeal from order denying suppression of evidence
- credibility findings are within sole province of trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the decision of the majority to quash the cross-appeal filed by Louis Slaton. The contrary decision by a panel of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa.Super. 143 , 452 A.2d 1355 (1982) is in conflict with prior Supreme Court decisions 1 and is properly overruled.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order directing suppression of forged prescriptions removed from Slaton’s files on December 6 and December 7, 1983. On those days, Slaton *345 expressly consented to searches of his files by agents of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Narcotics. This consent, according to all the evidence, was voluntary. It was neither forced nor induced by misrepresentation. On those occasions, Slaton delivered his files to the agents of the Bureau of Narcotics without asking and without being told the purpose or purposes of the search. Under these circumstances, his consent is not rendered involuntary merely because Slaton believed subjectively that the agents were looking for something different than they found. To the extent that the panel decision in Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490 , 418 A.2d 513 (1980) suggests a contrary result, I would cause it to be overruled. Having voluntarily surrendered his records for examination by government agents, Slaton gave up any expectation of privacy with respect to such records and cannot complain that the narcotic agents found incriminating evidence therein. I would reverse the order suppressing evidence and remand for trial on all charges.
. See: Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134 , 221 A.2d 115 (1966); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56 , 190 A.2d 304 (1963).