observing that the Romaine Court majority effectively recast as a statute of repose a provision that was previously understood as a statute of limitations, without reference to the previous decisions
How later courts described this case
- observing that the Romaine Court majority effectively recast as a statute of repose a provision that was previously understood as a statute of limitations, without reference to the previous decisions
- opining that Section 413(a) operates to bar both rights and remedies, and thus, sets forth a non-waivable defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chief Justice CAPPY
concurring.
I join the majority opinion in all respects save for its discussion of the allocation of the burden of proof regarding satisfaction of the statute of limitations found in Section 413 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. I join Justice Saylor’s Concurring Opinion with respect to this point. Indeed, as noted by Justice Saylor, the majority’s assertion that Section 413 “operates as a bar to the right as well as the remedy,” Majority Op. at 486, 901 A.2d at 485, implying it is a statute of repose, is in direct contravention of this Court’s prior and still-standing precedent. Smith v. WCAB (Concept Planners & Designers), 543 Pa.295, 670 A.2d 1146, 1148-49 (1996) (holding Section 413(a) to be a statute of limitations as “it operates in a *489 way that, practically speaking, extinguishes a remedy rather than a right”).
Justice EAKIN joins this concurring opinion.