stating the standard principal-agent duty of insurance procurers was “to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured,” and observing that an expanded duty “generally exists when the agent holds himself out as an insurance specialist, consultant or counselor and is receiving compensation for consultation and advice apart from premiums paid by the insured”
How later courts described this case
- stating the standard principal-agent duty of insurance procurers was “to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured,” and observing that an expanded duty “generally exists when the agent holds himself out as an insurance specialist, consultant or counselor and is receiving compensation for consultation and advice apart from premiums paid by the insured”
- stating “[i]t is the nature of the right sued upon and not the elements of relief requested that governs the selection of the appropriate statutory period”
- holding that neither years of service to a customer nor a customer's request for "sufficient" coverage created an expanded principal-agent relationship
- “Such a right exists when ‘events have developed to a point where the injured party is entitled to a legal remedy.’” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Dennis Langwith And Ben Langwith, Individuals v. American National General Insurance Company, A Corporation American National Property And Casualty Co., A Corporation And Janet Fitzgerald, Individually And D/b/a American National Janet Fitzgerald Insurance Services, 2010 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 148 (2010)
343 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1984), overruled on other grounds by, Langwith v. Am. Nat’l Gen. Ins., 793 N.W.2d 215
The opinion
UHLENHOPP, Presiding Justice
(con-
curring specially).
I concur in the result and in all of the majority opinion except the majority’s reason for the result in division II-C.
I. I think the words “transaction or occurrence that is the basis for such opposing party’s claim” in rule 29 of the rules of civil procedure should be' given a liberal rather than a strict construction so that all contentions in a controversy are disposed of in a single action to avoid multiplicity of suits. See Walters v. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank, 295 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1980) (“Rule 29 has as its objective the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits.”); Harrington v. Polk County Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 196 N.W.2d 543 (Iowa 1972).
Essentially the dispute between FBM and Sandbulte was whether FBM had to hold Sandbulte harmless beyond $50,000 on account of Sandbulte’s tort liability to Van-der Lugt growing out of the motor vehicle collision. In claiming that FBM did have to hold him harmless, Sandbulte had more than one string on his bow. His first string was his claim that the farm liability policy also covered his liability to Vander Lugt. Another string was his claim that FBM’s agents failed to advise him about adequate coverage so that he would be properly protected.
I think that when FBM sued Sandbulte for a declaration that the farm liability policy did not cover Sandbulte’s liability to Vander Lugt, Sandbulte could not simply claim that the policy did in fact cover his liability and keep back his claim that FBM nonetheless had to hold him harmless on the ground its agent failed to advise him about adequate coverage. If Sandbulte could keep back that second claim, he could string out the ultimate answer through two or more litigations instead of obtaining it in one case. That is not my conception of the purpose of the compulsory counterclaim requirement.
The general rule is that counterclaims can be interposed in declaratory judgment actions to set up the defendant’s side of the controversy. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 210 F.Supp. 735 (C.D.S.C.1962); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 169 F.Supp. 374 (E.D.Mich.1959), mandamus denied, 264 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.1959); Adams v. Bear, 87 Ariz. 288, 350 P.2d 751 (1960); Ramirez v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 170 So.2d 317 (Fla.App. 1964); Maynard & Child, Inc. v. Shearer, 290 S.W.2d 790 (Ky.1955); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General, 361 Mass. 401 , 280 N.E.2d 406 (1972); Missouri Managerial Corp. v. Pasqudlino, 323 S.W.2d 244 (Mo.App.1959); Dentina v. City of Hurst, 516 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Civ.App.1974); Gwinn v. Church of Nazarene, 66 Wash.2d 838 , 405 P.2d 602 (1965); see Jorge Const. Co. v. Weigel Excavating & Grading Co., 343 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1984) (not opposing parties); In re Hoelscher’s Estate, 249 Iowa 444, 450 , 87 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1958). I regard the majority’s cited authority as in conflict with this general rule. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Parks, 239 N.C. 680 , 80 S.E.2d 641 (1954) (per curiam); 22 Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 89 (1968) (cites Parks for authority). Moreover, declaratory judgment actions are not confined to a dec *467 laration of rights; affirmative relief may be granted and a jury may be impanelled if otherwise appropriate. Iowa R.Civ.P. 266, 268.
We cannot analogize from the statute of limitations cases in division I of the majority opinion, as the applicable principle is different. The appropriate statute of limitations is ascertained by determining the “actual nature of the action.” Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Iowa 1970). Under civil rule 29, however, a “compulsory” counterclaim is determined by whether it arose out of the same “transaction or occurrence”. Construing rule 29 liberally, this entire controversy arose out of the same objective occurrence; it does not involve some unrelated incident. This court construes the rules of civil procedure liberally. Board of Directors of Larralee Consolidated School District v. Cherokee County Board of Education, 260 Iowa 210 , 149 N.W.2d 304 (1967); Krueger v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 772 , 48 N.W.2d 266 (1951). Federal courts give a liberal or a broad realistic interpretation to their compulsory counterclaim rule in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Pipeliners Local Union No. 778 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir.1974); Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.1966); Magna Pictures Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 265 F.Supp. 144 (C.D.Cal.1967); Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 124 F.Supp. 728 (C.D.N. Y.1952), appeal dis’d, 210 F.2d 360 (2nd Cir.1954), aff'd, 220 F.2d 593 (2nd Cir.1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 , 75 S.Ct. 772 , 99 L.Ed. 1260 (1955); E.J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17 F.R.D. 267 (C.D.N.Y. 1955); Rosenthal v. Fowler, 12 F.R.D. 388 (C.D.N.Y.1952). I thus disagree with the majority’s reason for the result in its division II-C.
II. Under the facts of this particular case, however, Sandbulte should not be barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule. The parties’ prior correspondence makes clear that when FBM commenced the declaratory judgment action it requested the action be limited to the sole issue of the coverage of the farm liability policy and not be complicated by other issues. Sand-bulte obliged by confining the case to that issue. Under those circumstances FBM is in no position to advance the compulsory counterclaim rule in the present litigation. I thus concur in the result in division II-C of the majority opinion.