acknowledging the validity of Pinkerton instructions, but holding that a co-conspirator’s statement may not be introduced under any hearsay exception that is not reliability-based unless the statement is admissible as a co-conspirator’s statement made in furtherance of the conspiracy
How later courts described this case
- acknowledging the validity of Pinkerton instructions, but holding that a co-conspirator’s statement may not be introduced under any hearsay exception that is not reliability-based unless the statement is admissible as a co-conspirator’s statement made in furtherance of the conspiracy
- noting, based on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), that the "Confrontation Clause is only violated by the admission of incriminating evidence under a hearsay exception that is neither firmly-rooted nor reliability-based.”
- admitting out-of-court statements by non-testifying conspirators was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the court did not have the “requisite degree of assurance” that the verdict was unaffected by the statements
- "We need not decide whether any limiting instruction, combined with the Pinkerton charge, would set too contradictory a mental task before the jury.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Michael D. Tann v. United States, 2015 D.C. App. LEXIS 533 (2015)
Cooper on the. overt act of the conspiracy charge only, a charge for which, he was not prosecuted under a theory of vicarious liability, Akins is inapplicable and Cooper’s claim is meritless.
The opinion
FARRELL, Associate Judge,
concurring.
I join Judge Ruiz’s thoughtful opinion with this small qualification. We need not decide whether any limiting instruction, combined with the Pinkerton charge, would set too contradictory a mental task before the jury. Since the issue here is a constitutional one, the burden of persuading us of the efficacy of a particular limiting instruction must be on the government. I am not convinced that the instruction here did the job. Hence the need for the remand we order, to decide in effect whether the instruction was superfluous.