stating claims that sentencing court failed to consider evidence of defendant’s ability to pay - 17 - J. S52012/14 restitution and sentence of restitution is excessive under circumstances implicate discretionary aspects of sentencing
How later courts described this case
- stating claims that sentencing court failed to consider evidence of defendant’s ability to pay - 17 - J. S52012/14 restitution and sentence of restitution is excessive under circumstances implicate discretionary aspects of sentencing
- finding that restitution to insurer was a proper condition of intermediate punishment imposed for DUI conviction
- discussing certain distinctions of language between restitution as worded under the Crimes Code and restitution under the Sentencing Code
- victim’s insurance company was a victim itself therefore entitled to restitution as part of defendant’s sentence for drunk driving
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OLSZEWSKI,
Judge, concurring:
It is with the utmost reticence that I am constrained to differ with my distinguished colleagues on the issue of whether the Sentencing Code mandates full restitution in sentences of intermediate punishment. The majority acknowledges that the “plain language of § 9763(b)(10) requires the sentencing court to take into account the defendant’s ability to pay when ordering restitution as part of a sentence of intermediate punishment.” Majority at 1283-84 (footnote omitted). The majority nevertheless disregards this unambiguous language because it conflicts with their interpretation of the “clear legislative intent.” Id. The rules of statutory construction provide that “[wjhen words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. I recognize that these rules only apply when they do not result in a “construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901. While the analysis offered by the majority is persuasive, the intent of the General Assembly is by no means manifest in this matter. Accordingly, I would apply the rules of statutory construction, which require us to prefer the plain meaning of the statute over our suspicions as to the General Assembly’s intent. Because, however, the court could have awarded full restitution without considering the defendant’s ability to pay by simply electing to award restitution under the Crimes Code, see Majority at 1282 n. 1, I concur in the result.