holding that exclusion of relevant evidence is an abuse of discretion where the error was serious and prejudicial
How later courts described this case
- holding that exclusion of relevant evidence is an abuse of discretion where the error was serious and prejudicial
- reasoning that an expert’s ability to testify in general terms is insufficient to establish proximate cause
- “[p]roximate cause in a medical malpractice case must be established by expert testimony to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.”
- “An expert witness is a person who, because of education, training, or experience, possesses specialized knowledge beyond the ordinary understanding of the jury.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON, specially concurring:
I agree the trial court committed reversible error when it limited Dr. Goldstein’s testimony, and I agree a new trial is warranted, but I do not agree with the majority’s position on Dr. Young’s stricken testimony concerning whether he would have mentioned cancer and stroma invasion to Michelle Ayala’s gynecological oncologist.
It is true that an expert cannot be asked about his own conduct in order to establish a defendant doctor’s deviation from or adherence to the standard of care. See Glassman v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ill. App. 3d 730 (1994). But that was not the point of the question asked of Dr. Young. Counsel was trying to attack the persuasive value of Dr. Young’s opinions. It was an attack on his credibility. That is permissible. See Gallina v. Watson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 515, 521 (2004). If opposing counsel fears jury misuse of the testimony, a limiting instruction can be used to confine the jury to a proper consideration of the evidence.