stating that the “‘rule is far from being universal and has many qualifications upon its application.’ ” (quoting Greenleafs Lessee v. Birth, 6 Pet. 302, 312, 8 L.Ed. 406 (1832); citing 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 337, p. 413 (5th ed. 1999) (“Very often one must plead and prove matters as to which his adversary has superior access to the proof.”))
How later courts described this case
- stating that the “‘rule is far from being universal and has many qualifications upon its application.’ ” (quoting Greenleafs Lessee v. Birth, 6 Pet. 302, 312, 8 L.Ed. 406 (1832); citing 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 337, p. 413 (5th ed. 1999) (“Very often one must plead and prove matters as to which his adversary has superior access to the proof.”))
- recognizing the ordinary default rule that claimants bear the burden of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims may not apply to establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of their adversaries
- concluding that, where a statute was silent on the burden of persuasion and “[a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise,” the burden “lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief’
- holding that burden of proof in due process hearing is properly on party requesting relief, but leaving open whether states could override that rule through enactment of their own requirements
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Van Duyn Ex Rel. Van Duyn v. Baker School District 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (2007)
Van Duyn contends that Schaffer is inapplicable because it dealt with a challenge to the content rather than the implementation of an IEP, but that is a distinction without a difference.
Distinguished by James N. Van Duyn, for His Son, Christopher J. Van Duyn, a Minor & Incapacitated Person v. Baker School District 5j, 481 F.3d 770 (2007)
Van Duyn contends that Schaffer is inapplicable because it dealt with a challenge to the content rather than the implementation of an IEP, but that is a distinction without a difference.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
It is common ground that no single principle or rule solves all cases by setting forth a general test for ascertaining the incidence of proof burdens when both a statute and its legislative history are silent on the question. See Alaska Dept, of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461, 494, n. 17 (2004); see also ante, at 57; post, at 63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I do not understand the majority to disagree with the proposition that a court, taking into account “‘policy considerations, convenience, and fairness,’” post, at 63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), could conclude that the purpose of a statute is best effectuated by placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Moreover, I agree with much of what Justice Ginsburg has written about the special aspects of this statute. I have, however, decided to join the Court’s disposition of this case, not only for the reasons set forth in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, but also because I believe that we should presume that public school officials *63 are properly performing their difficult responsibilities under this important statute.