taking judicial notice of the case file of a previous appeal since it “is a public document, capable of being readily verifiable”
How later courts described this case
- taking judicial notice of the case file of a previous appeal since it “is a public document, capable of being readily verifiable”
- right to injunctive relief “rests on actual or presently threatened interference with another’s rights;” damage must be “likely and not merely possible”
- “The relationship between the law firm and [employee] is a contractual, at-will relationship. Until such a relationship is terminated, the at-will contract is of value to the law firm.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Settlement of Rush’s FELA claim against the railroad rendered this appeal moot. His law firm’s motion to dismiss the appeal should therefore have been allowed. I so voted when the motion was first presented to this court, and I continue to adhere to that view.
Even if the merits of the appeal were properly before us, I could not join in the majority’s opinion. Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that Callis, Papa, Jensen, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 292 Ill. App. 3d 1003 (1997) .(Callis I) was correctly decided. Under Callis I, the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in this case was plainly proper, and the judgment of the appellate court affirming the circuit court’s interlocutory order granting the preliminary injunction should be affirmed.
In reviewing the propriety of the circuit court’s preliminary injunction, there is one additional point that must be noted. The railroad’s appeal is premised on Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (166 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). In such an appeal, the only question properly before the reviewing court is whether there was a sufficient showing made to the trial court to sustain its order granting or denying the interlocutory relief sought. The rule may not be used as a vehicle to determine the merits of the case. Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1993).
Whether a preliminary injunction should have been granted or denied was a matter for the trial court’s sound discretion. A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 516 (1996). No abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court had a legal basis for granting the injunction. See Murges v. Bowman, 275 Ill. App. 3d 153, 159 (1995).
The trial court in this case clearly had a legal basis for ruling as it did. Its decision was mandated by Callis I. Callis I was binding on the circuit court, and it had no alternative but to adhere to that precedent. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539 (1992). Accordingly, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction.
Where, as here, a preliminary injunction is proper at the time it is issued, its validity is not subject to attack based on subsequent changes in the facts or the law. See Field v. Field, 79 Ill. App. 2d 355, 359 (1967). That does not mean, however, that the preliminary injunction is unchangeable. An injunction may always be modified or dissolved, as to its prospective effect, where equity no longer justifies a continuance of the injunction or the court finds that the law has changed. Benson v. Isaacs, 22 Ill. 2d 606, 609 (1961). That is so whether the change in the law is based on legislative action or judicial decision. Material Service Corp. v. Hollingsworth, 415 Ill. 284, 288 (1953). If my colleagues believe that Callis I is no longer good law, the appropriate course of action, therefore, is for them to vacate the preliminary injunction and to declare that the rule in Callis I will not be followed in the future.