Opinion

Griffiths v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

  • 596 Pa. 317
  • 943 A.2d 242
  • 2008 Pa. LEXIS 260
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 19, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Eakin
On the bench
Castille, Saylor, Eak, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Petrilla, Griffiths, Eakin
Cited by
22 cases

quadriplegic claimant may be entitled to a wheelchair accessible van because the van may constitute an “orthopedic appliance” under Section 306(f.l)(l)(ii) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),2 77 P.S. § 531(1)(ii), depending on the specific facts of the case

How later courts described this case

  • quadriplegic claimant may be entitled to a wheelchair accessible van because the van may constitute an “orthopedic appliance” under Section 306(f.l)(l)(ii) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),2 77 P.S. § 531(1)(ii), depending on the specific facts of the case
  • van, and not merely modifications thereto, was orthopedic appliance for quadriplegic claimant necessary to remedy lack of mobility resulting from work injury
  • home and vehicle modifications are reimbursable as medical expenses

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice EAKIN,

dissenting.

All are sympathetic with claimant David Griffiths’ condition and special needs, but the statutory language at issue does not support the majority’s conclusion a 2000 Ford Windstar is an “orthopedic appliance.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

When determining the breadth to be given this term, we must be guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., and the words of a statute should be interpreted according to their common usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. We should not interpret statutes with disregard of common meaning simply to reward a clever argument or accomplish a comfortable result. Here, the statute requires an employer to pay for “medicines and supplies, hospital treatment, services and supplies and orthopedic appliances, and prostheses____” 77 P.S. § 531(l)(ii). A vehicle is simply not ejusdem generis with the other items in the statute for which the legislature has required an employer to pay. Perhaps we could shoehorn into “orthopedic appliance” the items used to accomplish the retrofitting of a van; however, the van itself simply cannot be made to fit any reasonable understanding of the term.

There is a significant difference between requiring an employer to provide appliances to outfit a claimant’s van, and requiring the employer to buy a van for a claimant in the first place. Under the sweeping decision of the majority, employers must hereafter provide appliances that, the majority holds, include a vehicle. Many claimants will be undoubtedly surprised to find they could use just such an appliance. If there is to be a significant expansion of compensation payable, it should be accomplished by the General Assembly, in clear terms, not by a court calling a van an orthopedic appliance. This claimant undoubtedly could use a van, but the legislature did not require his employer to give him one. It required treatment and supplies, but no vehicle. We, who have no means of knowing the financial and collateral consequences of *349 this expansion of obligation, may not displace the legislature and change the statute to require more.

One may buy an “orthopedic appliance” in many places — the Ford dealership is not one of them.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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